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Ross: Cyberspace: The New Frontier for Housing Discrimination--An Anal

CYBERSPACE: THE NEW FRONTIER FOR
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION—AN ANALYSIS
OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND THE
FAIR HOUSING ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
This is not in a trendy neighborhood—very Latino.
Non-Women of Color NEED NOT APPLY.
Christian single straight female needed.1
Despite Congress’s enactment of the Fair Housing Act of 1968
(“FHA”), which regulates housing discrimination, one need spend only a
few minutes searching for housing via the Internet before finding blatant
FHA violations, such as the listing above. The FHA’s efforts to end
egregious housing practices aimed at persons of a particular race or
socioeconomic status has certainly had some success. Nevertheless,
those who wish to circumvent the FHA may now do so simply by using
the Internet to disseminate discriminatory housing advertisements.
Although more than forty years have passed since the civil rights
movement, discrimination continues as was recently seen in
advertisements stating racial preferences on websites designed to help
Hurricane Katrina victims find housing.2
As the Internet has quickly become a staple of mainstream society,
one might be inclined to question how such blatant discrimination is
permissible under the FHA. In short, discrimination is not allowed
under the FHA. The prevailing judicial interpretation of the FHA is that
liability for discriminatory housing advertisements falls both on the
creator of the discriminatory words and the intermediary, such as the
publisher of a newspaper or a housing pamphlet.3 If the FHA was the
1
These quotes were found on the Chicago Craigslist website and presented at trial in
Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights Under the Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681,
685–86 (N.D. Ill. 2006), a’ffd, 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that an online listing
service was not liable for discriminatory housing advertisements posted on its website by
third-party users of the service).
2
Infra note 24 (noting that in a December 2005 hearing before the House of
Representatives about housing discrimination after Hurricane Katrina, the executive
director of the Fair Housing Action Center reported receiving more than two hundred
discrimination complaints). A key provision of the FHA prohibits advertising that
expresses preference for or limitations on a potential buyer or renter based on “race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).
3
Infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing several cases in which intermediaries
were found liable for FHA violations).
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sole operating law governing discriminatory online housing
advertisements, the owner or operator of an online listing service could
likely be held liable for discriminatory housing advertisements posted on
his or her website, even if the posts were generated by a third party.4
The Communications Decency Act of 1995 (“CDA”) has a “Good
Samaritan” provision (“Good Samaritan provision”) that operates
contrary to the stated goals of the FHA.5
The Good Samaritan provision has been interpreted to insulate
online intermediaries from liability for discriminatory comments made
by third parties. Although congressional documentation indicates that
this immunity provision was designed to protect interactive computer
services that attempt to screen offensive content and to prevent an
onslaught of online defamation litigation, the Seventh and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have held the CDA may also be used to immunize
interactive computer services from FHA violations perpetrated by users
of their websites and forums.6 This Note proposes a textual revision to
the CDA that would prevent interactive computer services from
escaping liability for FHA violations contained in third-party user
postings on their websites.
Part II of this Note provides a comprehensive review of the conflict
between the CDA and the FHA.7 Next, Part III of this Note provides an
in-depth analysis of the discourse between the CDA and the FHA, the
Infra notes 21–24 and accompanying text (illustrating how the FHA extends liability to
the intermediaries of discriminatory housing advertisements and citing cases where
publishers of newspapers, listing services, and advertising brochures were held liable for
discriminatory advertisements generated by third parties).
5
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). This provision of the CDA is entitled “Protection for
‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material” and prevents interactive
computer services from being held liable for screening objectionable content on their
websites and forums. Id.
6
Infra Part II.D (explaining the Seventh and Ninth Circuit decisions in depth). See 141
CONG. REC. H8471–73 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). Representative Cox,
a co–sponsor of the bill that created the Good Samaritan provision, stated:
Currently, however, there is a tremendous disincentive for online
service providers to create family friendly services by detecting and
removing objectionable content. These providers face the risk of
increased liability where they take reasonable steps to police their
systems. A New York judge recently sent the online services the
message to stop policing by ruling that Prodigy was subject to a $200
million libel suit simply because it did exercise some control over
profanity and indecent material.
Id. at H8471.
7
Infra Part II.A (explaining the history and interpretation of the FHA); infra Part II.B–C
(describing the development and operation of the Internet and discussing the creation and
interpretation of the CDA); infra Part II.D (examining how the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
have dealt with the textual conflict between the CDA and the FHA).
4
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questionable existence of a circuit split, the adverse effects of the CDA’s
current application, and the proposed solutions to the conflict.8 Finally,
Part IV of this Note proposes a resolution to the conflict that amends the
CDA to eliminate all exceptions to the FHA and tailors the text of the
CDA’s Good Samaritan provision to apply to only those instances in
which Congress intended immunity to apply, such as when an
interactive service provider is treated as a publisher of third-party
generated defamation or when the service has made a good faith attempt
to screen “offensive” content on its website or user forums.9
II. BACKGROUND
Before analyzing the issues surrounding the tension between the
CDA and the FHA, a working knowledge of the Internet and an
understanding of the statutes at the heart of the conflict is needed.10
First, Section A highlights the development of the FHA, focusing on the
advertising provision laid out in Section 3604(c) of the FHA.11 Then,
Section B provides a brief history of the Internet’s development and
operation, including an overview of federalism and jurisdictional issues
that a court may face before it can decide an Internet-related action on
the merits.12 Next, Section C introduces the CDA by discussing the New
York case leading to its creation, its legislative history, and key statutory
interpretations of the CDA by the federal circuit and district courts.13
Finally, Section D discusses two major cases where the FHA’s expansive
imposition of liability for discriminatory advertisements directly
8
Infra Part III.A (considering whether the analytical differences between the Seventh
and Ninth Circuit opinions constitute a circuit split and suggesting the potential outcome if
the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in a case where an online
intermediary used the CDA to claim immunity for third party FHA violations); infra Part
III.B (addressing the major pitfalls of the CDA’s current application, including its
evisceration of a pertinent section of the FHA, its tendency to support a do-nothing
mentality among interactive computer services, its inconsistency with congressional intent,
and its ability to prevent victims of housing discrimination from seeking relief); infra Part
III.C (presenting the solutions posed by other scholars and addressing the strengths and
weaknesses of each one, culminating in a call for a textual revision to the CDA).
9
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006) (entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and
screening of offensive material”).
10
Infra Part II (providing the framework for understanding the conflict between the
FHA and the CDA).
11
Infra Part II.A (discussing the history and development of the FHA).
12
Infra Part II.B (providing a history of the Internet and special issues inherent to
Internet-related cases).
13
Infra Part II.C (tracing the CDA from its inception through the courts prior to Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008)
and Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights Under the Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th
Cir. 2008)).
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conflicted with the interactive computer service immunity provided by
the CDA.14
A. Development of the Fair Housing Act
One commentator described residential segregation as taking effect
“slowly and deliberately” after the turn of the Twentieth Century, with
the urban ghetto developing after World Wars I and II when African
Americans began moving into industrialized areas.15 Even prominent
and successful African American figures, such as Nat King Cole, were
victims of racially based housing discrimination.16 After race-restrictive
covenants were declared unconstitutional, African Americans who
bought or rented homes in white neighborhoods were given an icy
reception, often accompanied by violence.17
14
Infra Part II.D (discussing in depth the Roommate and Craigslist holdings and
rationales).
15
Mark Seitles, Note, The Reputation of Residential Racial Segregation in America: Historical
Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 89, 91 (1998) (briefly discussing race relations in America prior to the 1900s).
Others have traced the roots of housing segregation in the United States as far back as the
middle nineteenth century. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 289 (2004).
While a small number of African Americans owned homes in expensive neighborhoods
during the nineteenth century, many lived in crowded ghettos with derogatory nicknames,
such as “Nigger Hill” or “Little Africa.” Id. The living conditions in these ghettos affected
mortality rates as the potential for disease exposure and malnutrition was significantly
higher in these areas than in other communities. Id. at 289–90. Some African Americans
lived in “cold and exposed rooms and garrets, board shanties, five and six feet high, and as
many feet square . . . without any comforts, save the bare floor, with the cold penetrating
between the boards.” Id. at 290 (internal citation omitted). “Ghetto” in this Note is used as
it was by the National Advisory Commission on Disorders and is defined as “an area
within a city characterized by poverty and acute social disorganization, and inhabited by
members of a racial or ethnic group under conditions of involuntary segregation.” Report
of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 25 (1968) available at
http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
16
Rachel Kurth, Note, Striking a Balance Between Protecting Civil Rights and Free Speech on
the Internet: The Fair Housing Act vs. The Communications Decency Act, 25 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 805, 810 (2007). Kurth described Nat King Cole’s housing experience:
In August, 1948, popular music star Nat King Cole purchased an estate
in a wealthy Los Angeles neighborhood with his wife and children.
The Property Owners Association of the neighborhood expressed
prejudice against the wealthy, cultured and sophisticated black
singer’s presence in their community, and they tried to buy the home
back from him at a profit. Cole declined the offer and asserted his
rights to move into his home, only to be terrorized by his white
neighbors, who planted signs that said “Nigger Heaven” on his
property and burned the word “Nigger” into his front lawn.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
17
See BELL, supra note 15, at 290. See also Thomas J. Sugrue, The Unfinished History of
Racial Segregation, POVERTY & RACE, July 15, 2008, http://www.prrac.org/projects/
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In 1967, a study on racial violence, which was commissioned by
President Lyndon Johnson, found that segregated housing greatly
contributed to the volatile nature of large cities and “[d]iscrimination
prevents access to many non-slum areas, particularly the suburbs, where
good housing exists.”18 Within a year, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, which included Section 3604(c) of the FHA.19 Section 3604(c)

fair_housing_commission/chicago/sugrue.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2009).
“Whites
protested, picketed and used violence to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods, to prevent
the construction of racially-integrated public housing projects in their communities, and to
resist the development of affordable housing open to minorities.” Id. Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948) was considered a victory in the fight for desegregated housing. Kurth,
supra note 16, at 808. In Shelley, a white property owner sold his home to an African
American family in violation of a race restrictive covenant. 334 U.S. at 1. A disgruntled
neighbor sought enforcement of the covenant against the African American family, but the
Court refused and concluded that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant
violated the state action doctrine and would violate the defendants’ right to equal
protection. Id. at 20.
18
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 23 (1968),
http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2009). In
1967, following an explosion of racially motivated disturbances in American cities,
President Johnson established a commission to investigate three issues: what transpired in
those American cities; what factors contributed to the discourses; and what preventative
measures America should take. Id. at 1. In its research, the commission visited the riot
cities and spoke with witnesses and experts, finding that “[o]ur nation [was] moving
toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.” Id. Furthermore, the
commission found that federal housing programs were not performing as effectively as
predicted. Id. at 23. Specifically, the commission noted that:
To date, federal programs have been able to do comparatively little to
provide housing for the disadvantaged. In the 31-year history of
subsidized federal housing, only about 800,000 units have been
constructed, with recent production averaging about 50,000 units a
year. By comparison, over a period only three years longer, FHA
insurance guarantees have made possible the construction of over ten
million middle and upper-income units.
Id. at 24. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders posited several
recommendations to improve housing discrimination, including developing “a
comprehensive and enforceable federal open housing law to cover the sale or rental of all
housing, including single family homes.” Id. Other suggestions included a five-year plan
to bring more low and moderate income housing within reach of African Americans and
restructuring assistance programs to locate such housing away from the ghettos. Id.
19
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006). The statute states “[i]t is the policy of the United
States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States.” Id. § 3601. The provision regarding advertising of housing states:
[I]t shall be unlawful . . . [t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be
made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement,
with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any
preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.
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was intended to eliminate the special dangers posed by discriminatory
housing advertisements, such as psychological harm and stigmatic
effects.20
A plain reading of Section 3604(c) suggests that publishers are liable
to anyone who creates or transmits a discriminatory housing
advertisement.21 In other words, it makes publishing a discriminatory
advertisement a distinct and actionable wrong separate from the creation
of the advertisement.22 The “Mrs. Murphy exemption” is the only
Id. § 3604(c). The term “dwelling” as used in Section 3604(c) means: “any building,
structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy
as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or
lease for the construction or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion
thereof.” Id. § 3602(b).
20
Id. One writer stated that Section 3604(c) “works to prevent the substantial stigma,
humiliation, and other emotional injuries caused by encountering discriminatory
preferences or exclusions.” Jennifer C. Chang, Note, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace:
The Implications of the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 969, 975–76 (2002). Another commentator recounted a psychological study conducted
in the 1940s where African American school children were asked to choose between a black
doll and a white doll in response to a series of questions. Kurth, supra note 16, at 814–15.
African American school children across the country chose the white doll when asked
which one they liked better and which one was prettier, but they chose the black doll when
asked which one “looks bad.” Id. at 814. Section 3604(c) also promotes community
diversity and helps encourage the dissemination of accurate information about the law.
Chang, supra, at 974–76. Chang presents the following hypothetical situation:
For example, a housing consumer faced with numerous notices
specifying “no kids” might conclude that discrimination against
families with children is permissible in all cases. Such miseducation of
the public further frustrates fair housing efforts, which rely heavily on
private complainants who identify illegal housing practices. Unless
housing consumers are aware of their rights, they will not be alert to
violations of those rights.
Id. at 976–77.
21
Diane J. Klein & Charles Doskow, HOUSINGDISCRIMINATION.COM?: The Ninth
Circuit (Mostly) Puts Out the Welcome Mat for Fair Housing Act Suits Against RoommateMatching Websites, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 329, 335 (2008) (providing an explanation of
publisher liability as it pertains to the FHA). Klien and Doskow note:
The law expands the class of those held legally responsible for nondiscrimination in housing to include not just housing providers, but
those who publish their advertisements . . . [u]nder the FHA, the
“actual wrongdoers” are not limited to those who “originate the
allegedly unlawful content”—by writing and placing the ads—but also
those who publish them.
Id.
22
James D. Shanahan, Note, Rethinking the Communications Decency Act: Eliminating
Statutory Protections of Discriminatory Housing Advertisements on the Internet, 60 FED. COMM.
L.J. 135, 136 (2007) (arguing that the FHA holds publishers responsible for third–party
content). Shanahan explains:
The 1968 [FHA] protects the supply of housing for those who may
otherwise be discriminated against and functions to reduce overall
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loophole allowing for discrimination in housing under the FHA and
explicitly bars the exemption from applying to the advertising provision
in Section 3604(c).23 Federal district and circuit courts have liberally
applied Section 3604(c) to many media outlets in order to impose liability
for publishing discriminatory housing advertisements.24 That said, a
discrimination in the housing market. The plain language of the
statute indicates that it is intended to prevent newspapers and other
publishing media from publishing classified advertisements that
mention statutorily proscribed preferences in the sale or rental of a
dwelling. The FHA holds publishers of discriminatory advertisements
legally responsible for content provided by third parties.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
23
The “Mrs. Murphy exemption” is a nickname for Section 3603(b), which provides that:
[n]othing in section 3604 of this title (other than subsection (c)) shall
apply to . . . rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters
occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families
living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and
occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.
42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2). The nickname was derived because the original draft did not leave
room for people such as Mrs. Murphy, a woman who did not want to rent her
boardinghouse to African Americans. James D. Walsh, Note, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call
for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
605, 607–08 (1999). Some commentators have referred to the Mrs. Murphy exemption as “a
loophole big enough to drive a Mack truck full of roommate-seekers through.” Klein &
Doskow, supra note 21, at 334.
24
See Ragin v. N.Y. Times, 923 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding a newspaper
liable under the FHA for publishing housing advertisements that depicted only whites as
homeowners); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972) (stating “the
congressional prohibition of discriminatory advertisements was intended to apply to
newspapers as well as any other publishing medium”); Wheatley Heights Neighborhood
Coal. v. Jenna Resales Co., 447 F. Supp. 838, 842 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that a listing
service falls clearly within the scope of the FHA’s expansive liability); Saunders v. Gen.
Serv. Corp., 659 F. Supp 1042, 1057–59 (E.D. Va. 1987) (holding that an advertising brochure
violated Section 3604(c) because it did not contain an Equal Housing Opportunity logo nor
feature an adequate number of African American models in its pictures).
One
commentator argues that Section 3604(c)’s expansive language has not deterred housing
discrimination, which is evident from the blatant housing discrimination in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina. Stephen Collins, Comment, Saving Fair Housing on the Internet: The Case
for Amending the Communications Decency Act, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1491 (2008). In a
hearing before the House of Representatives concerning housing options for Hurricane
Katrina victims, the executive director of the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action
Center reported that he had received more than two hundred complaints about housing
discrimination since the hurricane hit. Housing Options in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Cmty. Opportunity of the House Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 70 (2006) (statement of David E. Garratt) available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid
=f:26753.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2009). The director brought twenty-eight pages worth of
discriminatory statements from websites, such as Katrinahousing.org, Katrinahome.com,
DHRonline, and reliefwelcomewagon.com. Id. A sample of the discriminatory statements
included: ‘‘I would love to house a single mom with one child, not racist, but white only’’;
‘‘Not to sound racist, but because we want to make things more understandable for our
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broad application of Section 3604(c) is at odds with the immunity
provided by the CDA because the FHA extends liability to
intermediaries.25 To shed additional light on the issue, Section B explains
the CDA and highlights some of the jurisdictional issues that may arise
regarding its application in an Internet-related housing discrimination
case.26
B. The Internet and the Communications Decency Act
The World Wide Web was developed for a society whose demand
for information and technology allowed Internet usage to spread quickly
into homes, offices, and classrooms via the personal computer.27 People
younger children, we would like to house white children’’; and “Provider will provide
room and board for $400 but prefers two white females.” Id. at 69–70. See also Jeffrey M.
Sussman, Student Article, Cyberspace: An Emerging Safe Haven for Housing Discrimination, 19
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 194, 215 (2007) (arguing that the application of the CDA to FHA
violations has made the Internet a sanctuary for those who wish to discriminate).
25
Infra Part II.D (discussing the Seventh and Ninth Circuit decisions in depth).
26
Infra Part II.B (providing an overview of the Internet’s development and special issues
inherent to Internet-related cases).
27
JAN SAMORISKI, ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE 25 (2002). The number of Internet hosts went
from about five million in 1995 to over seventy million in 2000. Id. at 25 fig. 2.3. The
number of websites increased from less than one million to more than eighteen million
between 1996 and 2000. Id. at 26, fig. 2.4. A 2004 study released by the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration reported that fifty-four percent of
American households had Internet access in the home. A NATION ONLINE: ENTERING THE
BROADBAND AGE, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/anol/NationOnlineBroadband04.
pdf. (last visited Oct. 24, 2009). According to the United States Census Bureau, more than
one hundred and two million Americans had Internet access in their homes as of 2006, and
an additional thirty-four million had Internet access at work. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
INTERNET ACCESS AND USAGE AND ONLINE SERVICE USAGE: 2006, http://www.census.gov/
compendia/statab/tables/08s1127.xls (last visited Aug. 1, 2009). Although the terms
“Internet” and “World Wide Web” are often interchanged, this practice is erroneous
because the World Wide Web is simply one method of accessing information on the
Internet. Webopedia, The Difference Between the Internet and the World Wide Web,
http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Internet/2002/Web_vs_Internet.asp
(last
visited Oct. 24, 2009). The Internet’s humble beginnings can be traced back to 1961 when a
Massachusetts Institute of Technology scientist began researching methods to connect
computers through digital bursts of data known as packet technology. SAMORISKI, supra at
22. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) became involved with
packet technology research in the mid-1960s in order to place the United States at the
forefront of military scientific advancement. Id. See also FRED FEDLER ET. AL., REPORTING
FOR THE MEDIA 407 (7th ed. 2001) (discussing early developments in digital technology,
such as the first time several university computer sites were connected via the Internet).
The modern Internet is built on Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
(“TCP/IP”), a system that allows data to be broken into smaller pieces, transmitted by
routers and servers, and reassembled at its final destination. JANINE S. HILLER & RONNIE
COHEN, INTERNET LAW & POLICY 6 (2002). The Internet was created in part out of concern
for the transmission of intelligence during a disaster, and the military found TCP/IP
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are increasingly turning to the Internet as a source for news and
information, which has resulted in a massive decrease in traditional print
source circulation.28 The latest technological advances have allowed
technology appealing because it was a “cheap, efficient, and almost indestructible system
of network communication . . . [with the] ability to maintain communication in the event of
disruption caused, for example, by nuclear war.” SAMORISKI, supra, at 23. The Domain
Naming System (“DNS”), which was originally government controlled, categorizes TCP/IP
addresses in a hierarchical structure of primary and secondary domain names. HILLER &
COHEN, supra at 6–7. In 1998, the Clinton Administration “enter[ed] an agreement with
[the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”)] to establish a
process to transition current U.S. Government management of the Domain Name System to
such an entity based on the principles of stability, competition, bottom-up coordination,
and representation." Johanna Ambrosio, Who Owns the Internet?, INFORMATIONWEEK
ONLINE, (July 26, 2006), available at http://www.informationweek.com/newsletters/daily/
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=191201674 (last visited Aug. 1, 2009). After a period of
research and proposals, the Clinton Administration awarded the contract to ICANN. Id.
ICANN is responsible for:
[m]anaging and coordinating the Domain Name System (DNS) to
ensure that every address is unique and that all users of the Internet
can find all valid addresses. It does this by overseeing the distribution
of unique IP addresses and domain names. It also ensures that each
domain name maps to the correct IP address. ICANN is also
responsible for accrediting the domain name registrars.
ICANN FAQ, http://www.icann.org/en/faq/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2009). The World Wide
Web is a portion of the Internet that relies on its own computer language and is distinct
from other components of the Internet, such as email, instant messaging, and Usenet news
groups. See Webopedia, supra. European Organization for Nuclear Research (“CERN”)
scientist Tim Berners-Lee is regarded as the father of the World Wide Web, as he developed
the programming protocols (hypertext transfer protocols or “HTTP”) that simplified online
navigation, linking computers to allow user accessibility of textual, visual, and audio files
from anywhere on the Internet. SAMORISKI, supra at 24–25. For a compilation of articles
discussing Tim Berners–Lee’s contributions in greater detail, see the CERN website at
http://cernsearch.web.cern.ch/cernsearch/Default.aspx?query=generic2:Public%20Tim%
20Berners-Lee (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).
28
Collins, supra note 24, at 1491. See William Pack, U.S. Newspaper Circulation Continues
to Decline, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 28, 2008, at 2C (reporting that the San Antonio
Express-News’ daily circulation had dropped by 7.7 percent since 2007, but its online
readership had increased 4.3 percent); Lorraine Mirabella, Sun’s Daily Circulation Falls 5.9%
Over Six Months, THE BALT. SUN, Oct. 28, 2008, at 15A (reporting that all of the nation’s top
twenty-five newspapers have recorded an average 4.8 percent decrease in the last six
months and that the loss is a result of competition from online news sources); Staff Report,
Los Angeles Times to Lay Off 75 Staffers, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 28, 2008, at C2 (noting that
the L.A. Times’ parent company laid off two hundred and fifty people in summer 2008,
including one hundred and fifty in the newsroom); Jenifer B. McKim, Delivering the News
Without the Paper, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 29, 2008, at 5 (reporting that the Christian
Science Monitor will be the first national newspaper to eliminate its print edition in favor of
improving the quality of its web edition). An ethics group leader from the Poynter
Institute, a prominent resource for journalists, stated that many newspapers are “teetering
on the brink of instability” and that she was not sure whether focusing solely on an online
edition was “a last dying gasp or . . . the first steps of transformation.” McKim, supra. In
addition to using the Internet as a resource for news, Americans are turning to the Internet
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users to access the Internet on cellular phones, personal digital assistants,
in vehicles, and even on airplanes.29 Although the Internet allows for the
exchange of ideas and information with increasing speed and efficiency,
its use poses serious questions for American lawmakers as to who
should exercise jurisdiction over the information superhighway.30
Jurisdiction gives a court the power to exercise legal authority over
persons, property, and issues, and is typically based on geographic and
political boundaries.31 The United States uses a dual system of
government that often raises questions on whether a particular issue is

for a variety of tasks, such as shopping, banking, stock trading, and job searching. See, e.g.,
Macy’s Website, http://www.macys.com (allowing users to browse and purchase items
from Macy’s department stores) (last visited Aug. 1, 2009); U.S. Bank Website,
http://www.usbank.com (providing U.S. Bank customers with online access to their
personal and business banking accounts) (last visited Aug. 1, 2009); E-Trade Online,
http://www.etrade.com (allowing people to buy and sell stocks online) (last visited Aug.
1, 2009); Monster, http://www.monster.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2009) (providing a forum
where people may search for jobs, submit résumés, and screen potential employees online).
29
See Tim Barker, Smart Phones Connect with More Customers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 9, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 17072747 (discussing consumer mechanisms for
coping without cell phones and the accompanying Internet access); Geek.com Team Post,
Internet in Your Car, http://www.geek.com/internet-in-your-car (discussing various
devices and service providers for Internet access in a motor vehicle); Wallstreet Fighter,
Internet Access On Airplanes Is Here, http://www.wallstreetfighter.com/2008/08/
internet-access-on-airplanes.html (discussing American Airlines’ decision to allow Internet
access for its patrons) (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
30
See infra notes 31–39 and accompanying text (discussing the problems faced by courts
attempting to exercise jurisdiction over Internet cases).
31
HILLER & COHEN, supra note 27, at 11. The term “jurisdiction” is a general term with
several definitions: “(1) [a] government’s general power to exercise authority over all
persons and things within its territory, (2) [a] court’s power to decide a case or issue a
decree, (3) [a] geographic area within which political or judicial authority maybe exercised;
(4) [a] political or judicial subdivision within such an area.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393
(3d pocket ed. 2006). A court’s jurisdiction consists of both personal and subject matter
elements, and the exercise of jurisdiction is improper if either element is not present.
JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 59 (5th ed. 2006).
Bases for personal jurisdiction include physical presence, domicile, consent, and
“minimum contacts.” Id. at 4. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (discussing the
traditional modes of obtaining personal jurisdiction); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (defining the “minimum contacts” test as a defendant’s minimum
contacts with a territory “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”) (internal citation omitted). Subject matter
jurisdiction is “[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the
extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra at 396. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning a
federal court has subject matter jurisdiction only if its power to hear a particular type of
case is authorized by the U.S. Constitution, federal statute, or judicial decision. JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET. AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 245 (9th ed. 2005).
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properly regulated by state or federal law.32 In the past, states have
enacted laws attempting to directly regulate aspects of the Internet,
including online pornography and alcohol distribution; however, the
dormant commerce clause invalidated most of those statutes.33
CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & ALLAN IDES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: NATIONAL POWER AND
FEDERALISM 268 (4th ed. 2007). Under the preemption doctrine, state law that is
inconsistent with the goals or text of valid federal law cannot stand. Id. The federal law
may include a textual provision explicitly preempting state law. Id. See Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (“[T]he provisions of
this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any
employee benefit described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section
1003(b).”); Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3003(d) (2006) (“This chapter
shall preempt State law to the extent such law is inconsistent with a provision of this
chapter.”). When it is impossible to comply with both a state and federal law, the
conflicting provisions of the state law invalidated. MAY & IDES, supra at 268; see Fla. Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (holding that the test of whether a
particular state statute can co–exist with a federal statute regulating the same subject is
“whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence
of the field”). Finally, a state law may be preempted when Congress intends to give the
federal government exclusive regulatory power over a particular subject matter, such as
interstate commerce. MAY & IDES, supra at 269. When regulation of the Internet is at issue,
the Commerce Clause typically answers these questions. HILLER & COHEN, supra note 27, at
11. The Commerce Clause provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Generally, the Commerce Clause allows Congress to
regulate three main categories of commerce: the channels of interstate commerce; the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and any activity that has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 366–67 (2005). The Dormant or Negative Commerce Clause, a purely judicial
interpretation, prohibits states from passing legislation regulating activity within their
boundaries that substantially hampers interstate commerce. HILLER & COHEN, supra note
27, at 12; see C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkston, 511 U.S. 383, 393–94 (1994)
(invalidating a flow-control ordinance that set up a mandatory processing facility for solid
waste because it discriminated against interstate commerce); Raymond Kassel v. Consol.
Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 678–79 (invalidating an Iowa statute prohibiting
the use of sixty-five-foot double trailers within its borders because it placed a substantial
burden on out-of-state trucking companies). Nevertheless, not all members of the Supreme
Court believe in the existence of the Dormant Commerce Clause. See Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The so-called ‘negative’ Commerce
Clause is an unjustified judicial invention, not to be expanded beyond its existing domain
. . .”); United Haulers Ass’n. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786,
1799 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The negative Commerce Clause has
no basis in the Constitution and has proved unworkable in practice.”).
33
HILLER & COHEN, supra note 27, at 12, 16. Hiller and Cohen noted that “[t]he plaintiffs
challenging these state laws argue that the Internet, by its borderless nature, is inherently a
form of interstate commerce, and a state’s attempt to regulate conduct on the Internet poses
an undue, and therefore, unconstitutional burden on it.” Id. at 12. See generally S.E.
Booksellers Ass’n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773 (2005) (granting pre-enforcement
enjoinment of a state statute that would impose criminal sanctions on those who
disseminate harmful materials to minors via the Internet because the statute violated the
First Amendment and the Commerce Clause); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005)
32
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Nevertheless, the states’ concerns regarding the Internet did not go
unnoticed by Congress, which has since passed legislation addressing
some controversial Internet issues.34 Even though the Commerce Clause
can make it difficult for states to enact new legislation directly regulating
an Internet user’s behavior, a state may still enforce its laws already on
record against an Internet-based defendant.35
The Internet’s broad coverage creates controversy in the realm of
personal jurisdiction.36 States that have not amended their long-arm
(invalidating Michigan and New York statutes regulating alcohol distribution because they
discriminated against interstate commerce). Despite the states’ argument that concern for
the ease with which minors could obtain alcohol via the Internet was a compelling state
interest, the Court found that the states did not adequately demonstrate the need for
discrimination such that the laws could be upheld under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489, 493.
34
For example, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 provides in
part:
No person engaged in the business of betting or wagering may
knowingly accept, in connection with the participation of another
person in unlawful Internet gambling—(1) credit, or the proceeds of
credit, extended to or on behalf of such other person (including credit
extended through the use of a credit card); (2) an electronic fund
transfer, or funds transmitted by or through a money transmitting
business, or the proceeds of an electronic fund transfer or money
transmitting service, from or on behalf of such other person; (3) any
check, draft, or similar instrument which is drawn by or on behalf of
such other person and is drawn on or payable at or through any
financial institution; or (4) the proceeds of any other form of financial
transaction, as the Secretary and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System may jointly prescribe by regulation, which involves a
financial institution as a payor [sic] or financial intermediary on behalf
of or for the benefit of such other person.
31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006). See also the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)
(2006) (immunizing interactive computer services from liability for third party user
content). The Twenty First Amendment provides, however, that “[t]he transportation or
importation into any State, Territory or possession on the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. In Granholm, the Court addressed the states’ arguments under
Section 2, holding that states have broad power to regulate some Internet activity under the
provision, but that they must do so evenhandedly, treating in-state and out-of-state entities
alike. 544 U.S. at 493.
35
Supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the Commerce Clause’s invalidation
of state laws attempting to regulate Internet behavior); infra note 36 and accompanying text
(providing an example of how one state amended its long-arm statute to reach Internet
defendants for purposes of personal jurisdiction).
36
HILLER & COHEN, supra note 27, at 16. In response to Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, a
case that set forth the “minimum contacts” test, many states passed long-arm statutes
enumerating certain types of contact with the state that would give courts within the state
personal jurisdiction over a defendant. GLANNON, supra note 31, at 24–25; see Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382(A)
(2004). The statute states:
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statutes to include Internet contacts rely on the Supreme Court’s
evolving standard in this relatively new area of personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence.37 Although the Internet exposes the antiquity of the
(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the
person’s:
(1) Transacting any business in this state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission
outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;
(5) Causing injury in this state to any person by breach of
warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this
state when he might reasonably have expected such person to use,
consume, or be affected by the goods in this state, provided that he
also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;
(6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act
outside this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons,
when he might reasonably have expected that some person would be
injured thereby in this state;
(7) Causing tortious injury to any person by a criminal act, any
element of which takes place in this state, which he commits or in the
commission of which he is guilty of complicity;
(8) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in
this state;
(9) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located
within this state at the time of contracting.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382. North Carolina, for example, has addressed the
problem by amending its long-arm statute to include Internet contacts with the state. See
e.g. N.C. GEN STAT. § 1-75.4 (2007). The Local Injury, Foreign Act category of the North
Carolina long-arm statute includes “[u]nsolicited bulk commercial electronic mail [that is]
sent into or within this State by the defendant using a computer, computer network, or the
computer services of an electronic mail service provider in contravention of the authority
granted by or in violation of the policies set by the electronic mail service provider.” Id. §
1.75.4(4)(c). For a complete listing of state long-arm statutes and a discussion of how each
state treats electronic contacts for purposes of personal jurisdiction, see Vedder, Price,
Kaufman & Kammholz, P.C., Long Arm Statutes: A Fifty-State Survey (2003) (available at
http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf) (last
visited Aug. 1, 2009).
37
HILLER & COHEN, supra note 27, at 17. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257
(1996) (holding that a Texas defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio because
he was party to a contract governed by Ohio law and sent several emails to the Ohio-based
plaintiff). In CompuServe, the Court employed the standard of “purposeful availment”
articulated by Justice O’Connor in Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1265. In Asahi, Justice O’Connor argued that “[t]he placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J.,
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Court’s jurisdictional doctrines, history shows that the law will
eventually adapt accordingly, even if it is in a Johnny-come-lately
fashion.38 Thus, a court can hear an Internet-related case on the merits
only when the parties clear the personal and subject-matter jurisdiction
hurdles.39 Next, this Note steps away from the jurisdictional issues
courts may face regarding Internet-related cases and focuses on the
CDA’s regulation of the Internet.40
C. Development of the Communications Decency Act
In 1995, a New York trial court rendered a decision that compelled
Congress to amend the Telecommunications Act of 1934.41 In Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., the New York Supreme Court
considered whether an Internet service provider could be held liable for

plurality opinion); cf. Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Com., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.
Pa. 1997) (holding that a California-based defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania by virtue of its doing online business with Pennsylvania residents). In Zippo,
the court found that the validity of personal jurisdiction “is directly proportionate to the
nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.” Zippo,
952 F. Supp. at 1124.
38
HILLER & COHEN, supra note 27, at 21. Hiller and Cohen compare the Internet to the
advent of the assembly line and mass production of the automobile, arguing that “[w]hile
the world of physical transactions may be like the stagecoach, and thus many of the rules
developed to govern it may not be applicable to the Internet, the underlying legal
principles will be applied to the electronic environment as they were to the automobile.”
Id. at 22.
39
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of personal and
subject matter jurisdiction).
40
See infra Part II.C (discussing the development and application of the CDA). This
Note does not further address jurisdictional issues related to the Internet. Part II.B.2
provides a cursory understanding of some of the issues a court may address before an
action involving the Internet may be heard on the merits. This Note’s primary focus is on
the substance of the CDA, its controversial applications, and ways in which it may be
improved.
41
Kurth, supra note 16, at 821 (arguing that the CDA was to effectively overrule the
decision in Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.). See Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (modernizing the Telecommunications Act of 1934
to incorporate Internet transmissions). See also Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co.,
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). Stratton Oakmont, an investment-banking
firm, commenced a libel action against Prodigy, an Internet service provider, resulting from
several postings on a user message board. Id. at *1. Stratton Oakmont’s president claimed
the firm was defamed on a message board owned and operated by Prodigy. Id. “Money
Talk,” the online bulletin board on which the allegedly defamatory statements appeared,
was “the leading and most widely read financial computer bulletin board in the United
States [in 1994], where members [could] post statements regarding stocks, investments, and
other financial matters.” Id. Among the statements were claims that Stratton Oakmont
was a “cult of brokers who either lie for a living or get fired” and that Stratton Oakmont’s
President had committed criminal and fraudulent acts in the public sale of stock. Id.
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the content of its online message board.42 Ultimately, the Stratton
Oakmont court found that the Internet service provider had published the
defamatory statements and reasoned that its “conscious choice, to gain
the benefits of editorial control, had opened it up to a greater liability
than . . . other computer networks that make no such choice.”43 Some
commentators interpret Stratton Oakmont as imposing publisher liability
in defamation actions on any online service that exercises any degree of
control over the content of its user forums.44 In response to the Stratton
Oakmont decision, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
which was designed to “promote competition and reduce regulation in
order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of

Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *3. In order for Stratton Oakmont to prevail, it
had to prove that Prodigy published the allegedly defamatory statements. Id. Generally, a
defendant who repeats or republishes libel is subject to the same liability as if he had
published the original. Id. (citing Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (1980)).
Distributors of communication, however, are considered passive conduits of defamatory
information and will not be held liable for its content unless they know or have reason to
know of the defamation. Id. Libel is “the publication of defamatory matter by written or
printed words, by its embodiment in physical form, or by any other form of
communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or
printed words.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977). “Publication” is a legal
term of art meaning that the harmful content is communicated by the defendant to a third
party. EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 442 (4th ed. 2005). Four years after
Stratton Oakmont was decided, the company’s chairman and president both pleaded guilty
to ten counts of money laundering and securities fraud. Edward Wyatt, Stratton Oakmont
Executives Admit Stock Manipulation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C06E6DC123FF937A1575AC0A96F958
260 (last visited Aug. 1, 2009). The two men had participated in a seven-year scheme
manipulating the stocks of thirty-four companies and defrauding investors of millions of
dollars. Id.
43
1995 WL 323710, at *5. The New York Supreme Court found that Prodigy had held
itself out as controlling the content of its message boards by utilizing an automated filtering
system and by implementing guidelines for users and Board Leaders to follow. Id. at *4.
The court noted that Prodigy’s system “may have a chilling effect on freedom of
communication in Cyberspace, and it appears that this chilling effect is exactly what
Prodigy wants, but for the legal liability that attaches to such censorship.” Id. at *5.
44
See generally Douglas B. Luftman, Note, Defamation Liability for On-line Services: The
Sky is Not Falling, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (1997) (describing the post-Stratton
Oakmont sentiment as a “‘the sky is falling’ reaction” that would have amused Chicken
Little). Luftman argues that if online services listen to “the sky is falling” advice and
relinquish editorial control of their user forums, it will result in a self-fulfilling prophecy of
stagnation from Internet users’ dissatisfaction with chaotic interactive environments. Id.
Also, Representative Cox stated that the New York court’s ruling had sent a message to
interactive computer services that they would be held liable for defamatory postings if they
exercised control over the content posted by third party users. See 141 CONG. REC. H8471
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
42
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new telecommunications technologies.”45 The CDA is a section within
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that supports development of the
Internet, encourages a free market for the Internet, and promotes the
control of offensive content by interactive computer services.46
Prior to the enactment of the CDA, Congress considered two similar
communications bills—the Exon-Coats bill in the Senate and the CoxWyden bill in the House of Representatives.47 The Exon-Coats bill won
45
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). In an
attempt to modernize the outdated Telecommunications Act of 1934, the updated version:
[F]undamentally restructures local telephone markets, ending the
monopolies that states historically granted to local exchange carriers
and subjecting incumbent local exchange carriers to a host of duties
intended to facilitate market entry, including the obligation to share
their networks with competitors . . . .
. . . .
Specifically, telecommunications carriers have the duty to interconnect
directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other
telecommunications carriers; in addition, such carriers are not to install
network features, functions, or capabilities that do not comply with
guidelines and standards established in various sections of the Act
regarding access by persons with disabilities and coordination for
interconnectivity.
74 AM. JUR. 2d Telecommunications § 16, 309-10 (2001).
46
See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). Congress listed several policy reasons within the statute
for the inclusion of the CDA:
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media; (2) to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage the development of
technologies which maximize user control over what information is
received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and
other interactive computer services; (4) to remove disincentives for the
development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that
empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material; and (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement
of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity,
stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
Id. § 230(b)(1)–(5). The CDA originally regulated the dissemination of pornography on the
Internet and protected online services that blocked offensive content. See infra note 55
(discussing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the case that invalidated the CDA’s
provisions related to pornography dissemination).
47
Kurth, supra note 16, at 821; infra notes 47–51 and accompanying text (discussing the
Exon-Coats and Cox-Wyden bills). Senator James Exon became a champion for children
against the dangers of Internet predators and pornography in 1994 after watching a
Dateline special about Internet pedophiles. Kurth, supra note 16, at 821. In addition to the
Dateline special, the infamous Rimm Study of Internet pornography suggested that eightythree percent of the images available on the Internet were pornographic. Robert Cannon,
The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians
on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 53 (2006). The phenomenon piqued
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the Senate’s approval in June 1995 despite strong opposition from those
who wished to abstain from Internet regulation and those who believed
the proposed amendment was riddled with escape hatches for
pornographers.48
national interest when Time magazine ran a cover story about the study. Id. at 54. Not
everyone believed, however, that the world’s largest red light district was only a click
away, as several professors criticized the study claiming that the methodology and
procedure were flawed and that the study was conducted in an ethically questionable
manner. Id. at 56. See also Lisa Sigel & Geoffrey Sauer, Critique of Rimm Article on Online
Pornography, http://sloan.ucr.edu/cyberporn/sigel.sauer.critique.htm (last visited Aug. 24,
2009) (criticizing many of the research techniques employed in the Rimm study). On July
26, 1994, Senator Exon proposed a communications decency amendment intended to “help
assure that the information superhighway does not turn into a red light district . . . [and to]
protect children from being exposed to obscene, lewd, or indecent messages.” 140 CONG.
REC. 18046 (1994) (statement of Sen. Exon). Senator Exon explained that the amendment
was also designed to modernize the Telecommunications Act of 1934, noting that the Act’s
provisions “were couched in the context of telephone technology [and] . . . must be
updated for the digital world of the future.” Id. In addition to shielding children from
pornographic images, the amendment was to prevent online stalking and other misuse of
the Internet. Id. The Exon-Coats bill would extend criminal penalties for indecency and
obscenity-based violations, which had previously applied only to telephone services, and
would place regulatory control in the hands of the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”). Chang, supra note 20, at 989. Specifically, the amendment would replace
references to “telephone” with the phrase “telecommunications device” and increase
penalties for violations to one hundred thousand dollars and two years imprisonment. 140
CONG. REC. 18045 (1994) (statement of Sen. Exon) (containing the revisions proposed by
Senator Exon).
48
Cannon, supra note 47, at 66. On April 7, 1995, Senator Leahy proposed an alternative
bill that called for a study to be conducted by the Department of Justice and the
Department of Commerce. See S. 714, 104th Cong. (1995). Upon introduction, Senator
Leahy noted:
Many of us are, thus, justifiably concerned about the accessibility of
obscene and indecent materials on-line and the ability of parents to
monitor and control the materials to which their children are exposed.
But government regulation of the content of all computer and
telephone communications, even private communications, in violation
of the First Amendment is not the answer—it is merely a knee–jerk
response.
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., LEAHY STATEMENT ON INTRODUCTION OF S.714,
http://www.cdt.org/speech/cda/950407s714_leahy_statement.html (last visited Aug. 24,
2009). On June 7, 1995, Senator Grassley introduced a bill that censored the Internet and
provided no defenses for violators. See S. 892, 104th Cong. (1995). The Grassley bill would
create two distinct criminal offenses. 141 CONG. REC. S7922 (daily ed. June 7, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Grassley). The first would have made it a crime to “knowingly or
recklessly transmit indecent pornography to minors.” Id. The second would have been
applicable to online services that allowed users to post to bulletin boards and would have
made it unlawful to “willfully permit an [adult] to transmit indecent pornography to a
minor.” Id. When Senator Grassley introduced the bill, he noted that “[w]ith the rise of
global, international computer networks . . . Congress has a more extensive role to play in
protecting children. [This] initiative responds to this changed environment by ‘filling in
the gaps’ created by new technology.” Id.
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Protecting children from accessing sexually explicit material on the
Internet was one of the motivating factors behind the Cox-Wyden bill in
the House, but the bill was also proposed in opposition to the regulatory
scheme created by the Senate’s Exon-Coats bill and the Stratton Oakmont
decision.49 The Cox-Wyden bill would have overruled Stratton Oakmont
and protected “interactive computer services” against liability resulting
from third-party Internet content.50 Despite the rejection, the CoxWyden bill was included as Section 230 of the CDA; however, one
49
Chang, supra note 20, at 988–91 (listing the motivations behind the Cox-Wyden bill).
Specifically, members of the House were aware of the public’s negative response to the
recently passed Senate bill and believed it might place unconstitutional restrictions on
speech. Id. at 989–90. Representative Cox argued that “[t]he Cox-Wyden amendment
removes the liability of providers such as Prodigy who currently make a good faith effort
to edit the smut.” 141 CONG. REC. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
See Michelle V. Rafter, On-line Protestors Rally Against Decency Act, ST. LOUIS POST–
DISPATCH, Dec. 20, 1995, at 7C, available at 1995 WLNR 737201. “Close to 9,000 people had
notified the lobby group that they had contacted their congressional representatives to
protest Internet censorship, and new email messages were rolling in at the rate of a
thousand every 10 minutes.” Id. See also supra note 43 (detailing the New York trial court’s
approach in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
24, 1995)).
50
Kurth, supra note 16, at 825 (arguing that in overruling Stratton Oakmont, Congress
intended to promote self-regulation on the Internet). “Interactive computer service” is
defined within the text of the CDA as “any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C. §
230(f)(2) (2006). At the heart of the provision was the notion that those interactive
computer services that made good-faith efforts to screen their content should not be liable
if a piece of offensive information evades the filters. Kurth, supra note 16, at 824. The
House bill forwent assigning regulatory control to the FCC in favor of utilizing a system
that would encourage interactive computer services and individuals to screen potentially
harmful content. Chang, supra note 20, at 990 (discussing the House’s view that the
inclusion of the FCC would be less effective and efficient than allowing self-regulation on
the Internet). Representative Cox stated that “[i]f we regulate the Internet at the FCC, that
will freeze or at least slow down technology. It will threaten the future of the Internet. That
is why it is so important that we not have a Federal computer commission do that.” 141
CONG. REC. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). The House passed the
Cox-Wyden bill by a majority vote of 402–04 in what appeared to be a landslide victory for
those who expressed anti–regulatory sentiment regarding the Internet. CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH., POLICY POST, (Aug. 4, 1995), available at http://www.cdt.org/
publications/pp230804.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2009). The “Policy Post” newsletter
claimed that the Cox-Wyden bill:
[prohibited] the FCC from imposing content regulations on the
Internet or other interactive media[,] [removed] disincentives for
online service providers to exercise editorial control over their
networks and to provide blocking and screening technologies to their
uses[,] [and sought] to create a uniform national policy prohibiting
content regulations in interactive media.
Id.
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commentator describes its inclusion as a hollow victory because it has no
effect on the provisions in the CDA that came from the Exon-Coats bill.51
Specifically, Section 230(c) contains a Good Samaritan provision that is
particularly important for the purposes of this Note.52 A plain reading of
the Good Samaritan provision suggests that all claims involving
publisher liability resulting from third-party user postings are barred,
but Congress failed to define the scope of immunity and the phrase
“publisher or speaker.”53 Further arguments exist as to whether
Cannon, supra note 47, at 68. Cannon called the Cox-Wyden Amendment “far from a
victory,” noting that the amendment “specifically and curiously stated that ‘nothing in this
section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 of’ Title 47, the very
statute that [the Exon-Coats bill] sought to amend. As a result, the House and Senate
amendments were described as fitting together ‘like a hand in a glove.’” Id. (quoting 141
Cong. Rec. H8468–69 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
52
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). Section 230(c)’s grant of immunity directly conflicts with
the expansive liability contained in Section 3604(c) of the FHA. See id. The provision reads:
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of
offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or
not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical means
to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).
Id. The statute defines “information content provider” as “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” Id. § 230(f)(3). See also
supra note 50 (defining “interactive computer service”). See generally infra Parts III–IV
(discussing the CDA’s conflict with the FHA and proposing a revision to the text of Section
230(c)(1)).
53
Chang, supra note 20, at 984 (stating that the Good Samaritan provision is unclear as to
how “publisher” should be defined); 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). At common law, whether a person
was a “publisher” for purposes of imposing defamation liability hinged on the “extent to
which he participates with an author . . . of the defamatory statement in its publication.”
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 113 (5th ed. 1984). Actors who are more intimately
involved in the process may be held liable “because they have the opportunity to know the
content of the material being published.” Id. §113. In contrast, “one who only delivers or
transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if,
he knows or had reason to know of its defamatory character.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 581 (1977). The ordinary meaning of publisher is “[o]ne who publishes or makes
something public; one who declares, announces or proclaims publicly . . . [o]ne who puts
51
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Congress intended the Good Samaritan provision to apply beyond
defamation cases, and, if so, whether the list of exceptions is
exhaustive.54 Generally, the courts have interpreted the Good Samaritan

anything into circulation.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 785–86 (2d ed. 1989); cf. Zeran v.
Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997). The court found that “a publisher is not
merely one who intentionally communicates defamatory information. Instead, the law
treats as a publisher or speaker one who fails to take reasonable steps to remove
defamatory statements from property under her control.” Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1133.
54
Section 230(e) provides several exceptions where the Good Samaritan provision does
not apply:
(e) Effect on other laws
(1) No effect on criminal law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the
enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating
to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of
title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.
(2) No effect on intellectual property law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand
any law pertaining to intellectual property.
(3) State law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any
State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this
section. No cause of action may be brought and no liability may
be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.
(4) No effect on communications privacy law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the
application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
or any of the amendments made by such Act, or any similar State
law.
47 U.S.C. § 230(e). See Chang, supra note 20, at 991. “[T]he House also recognized that the
application of traditional common law defamation principles in the context of the Internet
might serve as an obstacle to harnessing the cooperation of the private sector.” Id. But see
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, No. CV 0309386PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004), rev’d, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008). The court relied on the canon of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, which means “[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a
general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence
of a contrary legislative intent.” Id. at *3. According to Sutherland:
As the maxim is applied to statutory interpretation, where a form of
conduct, the manner of its performance and operation, and the persons
and things to which it refers are designated, there is an inference that
all omissions should be understood as exclusions. The maxim does not
apply to every statutory listing or grouping. It has force only when the
items expressed are members of an associated group or series,
justifying the inference that the items not mentioned were excluded by
deliberate choice.
2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23, 398–99, 401, 404-6, 412 (7th ed. 2007)
(internal citations omitted).
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provision as providing near-absolute immunity for third-party FHA
violations to interactive computer services.55
Section 230’s first major challenge came in Zeran v. America Online,
Inc.56 In this seminal case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that Section 230 provided immunity to an interactive computer service
55
Infra notes 56–71 and accompanying text (discussing several cases where courts have
found interactive computer services to be immune from publisher liability through the
CDA for third-party tort and statutory infractions). Section 223, a series of provisions
originally proposed in the Exon-Coats bill, was the first portion of the CDA to be
interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997). In Reno, immediately after President Bill Clinton signed the CDA, twenty plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of CDA provisions designed to protect children from
“indecent communications.” Id. at 861. In a facial challenge to the new statute’s
constitutionality, the Court unanimously held that two provisions of Section 223 were
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, finding that:
[G]iven the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it
unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be
entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further
reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The CDA’s
burden on protected speech cannot be justified if it could be avoided
by a more carefully drafted statute.
Id. at 874. Congress addressed the legislation’s flaws in its introduction of the Child Online
Protection Act, but a similar constitutional challenge was brought within less than twentyfour hours of President Bill Clinton’s signing of the bill. Sheryl Rakestraw, Current Event,
10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 521, 521 n.3 (2002).
56
958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va. 1997), a’ffd, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). Shortly after the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, an anonymous America Online (AOL) member defamed
Zeran on an AOL message board. Id. at 1127. The poster listed Ken Zeran’s name and
telephone number on a phony advertisement for shirts that carried messages such as “Visit
Oklahoma . . . It's a BLAST!!!,” “Putting the kids to bed . . . Oklahoma 1995,” and “McVeigh
for President 1996.” Id. Zeran received a “flood of abusive telephone calls,” estimating
about one every two minutes. Id. at 1128. Similar false advertisements appeared on the
message boards even after Zeran notified AOL, and the phone calls did not subside until
more than three weeks later. Id. Zeran brought a negligence action against AOL for its
failure to remove the allegedly defamatory postings from its message boards, but AOL
argued that Zeran’s action was preempted by the Good Samaritan provision. Id. at 1129.
Zeran’s theory was derived from Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). Id. at 1128–29. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 141 (holding that information distributors
cannot be held liable unless they knew or had reason to know that the information was
defamatory). The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia also considered the
three instances under which preemption is proper: where Congress expresses an intent to
displace state law, where Congress implies such an intent, or where state law conflicts with
federal law. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1129 n.9 (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78
(1990)). The court reasoned that Zeran had miscategorized distributor liability as distinct
and separate from publisher liability when it was in fact “a species or type of liability for
publishing defamatory material.” Id. at 1133. The court agreed with AOL, holding that
“although the CDA does not preempt all state law causes of action concerning interactive
computer services, it does preempt Zeran’s claim. This is so because his ‘negligence’ cause
of action conflicts with both the express language and the purposes of the CDA.” Id. at
1135.
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from a state law claim that treated the interactive computer service as a
publisher.57
In June 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
meaning of “provided” for the purposes of Section 230(c)(1).58 In Batzel
v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “provided” referred only to
“third-party information provided for use on the Internet or another
interactive computer service” and remanded the case to determine if the
information at issue had been “provided” under Section 230(c)(1).59 In
57
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31. The Fourth Circuit found the congressional intent “not
difficult to discern.” Id. The court specifically noted that “[t]he imposition of tort liability
on service providers for the communications of others represented, for Congress, simply
another form of intrusive government regulation of speech. Section 230 was enacted, in
part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep
government interference in the medium to a minimum.” Id. The plaintiff continued to rely
on a theory of distributor liability, but the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial
court reasoning that computer-based companies may be liable each time they are notified
that a potentially defamatory statement is posted on their message boards. Id. at 333. The
court reasoned that:
Each notification would require a careful yet rapid investigation of the
circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal judgment
concerning the information’s defamatory character, and an on–the–
spot editorial decision whether to risk liability by allowing the
continued publication of that information. Although this might be
feasible for the traditional print publisher, the sheer number of
postings on interactive computer services would create an impossible
burden in the Internet context.
Id.
58
See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 2003). In Batzel, a handyman who
performed housework for an attorney sent an email to the Museum Security Network
(“MSN”) alleging that the attorney said she was a descendant of a high ranking Nazi
official and suggesting that the artwork in the attorney’s home may have been stolen from
Jewish people during World War II. Id. at 1020–21. The sole operator of MSN sent the
message to the MSN subscribers via listserv (an automated emailing list). Id. at 1021. The
listserv mailings “[were] read by hundreds of museum security officials, insurance
investigators, and law enforcement personnel around the world, who use the information
in the [MSN] posting to track down stolen art.” Id. at 1022. The attorney filed a defamation
action against several parties, including MSN, claiming that the handyman fabricated the
allegations because she refused to show his screenplays to her Hollywood contacts and that
she had lost several prominent clients because of the MSN listserv mailing. Id. The trial
court denied MSN’s motion to strike under California’s anti–SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation) statute (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16) and his motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1023.
59
333 F.3d at 1033. The handyman claimed that he never thought his e–mail would be
posted on an international message board and that he never would have sent the e–mail
had he known that it would be used in such a manner. Id. at 1032. The Ninth Circuit
provided the following example to illustrate its rationale:
So, if, for example, an individual who happens to operate a website
receives a defamatory “snail mail” letter from an old friend, the
website operator cannot be said to have been “provided” the
information in his capacity as a website service. Section 230(c)(1)
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August 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Section 230
provided immunity for an online match-making service when a user
posted a false profile depicting a celebrity.60
In Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., the Ninth Circuit narrowed its interpretation of
“information content provider” and concluded the interactive computer
service in question did not play a pertinent part in “creating, developing,
or ‘transforming’ the relevant information.”61
In the same year, a U.S. District Court in Virginia expanded the
scope of Section 230(c) to bar a claim brought under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.62 Although the plaintiff in Noah v. AOL Time Warner,

supplies immunity for only individuals or entities acting as
“provider[s]” or “user[s]” of an “interactive computer service,” and
therefore does not apply when it is not “provided” to such persons in
their roles as providers or users.
Id. at 1033 (internal citation omitted). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the
interactive computer service’s argument that the handyman’s confusion was irrelevant
because the handyman was the author of the email. Id. Furthermore, on remand, the issue
of whether the handyman was a “provider” was not resolved; North Carolina’s res judicata
doctrine entitled the interactive computer service to summary judgment because the case
was previously dismissed by a North Carolina trial court for failure to prosecute. Id.
60
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003). Christine
Carafano was a popular actress, staring in television shows, such as “Star Trek: Deep
Space Nine” and “General Hospital.” Id. at 1121. She began receiving threatening and
sexually explicit phone calls in response to a Matchmaker.com (owned and operated by
Metrosplash) personal profile designed by an unknown person in Berlin, Germany. Id.
Carafano filed a suit against Metrosplash alleging defamation, negligence, invasion of
privacy, and misappropriation of the right of publicity. Id. at 1122.
61
Id. at 1125. Carafano argued that Metrosplash should be considered an information
content provider because it asked a series of questions and provided a drop down menu
for “pre-prepared responses,” but the court found that even if Metrosplash could be
considered an information content provider, Section 230(c) would still bar the claim “unless
Matchmaker created or developed the particular information at issue.” Id. The court
reasoned that Carafano’s contact information was “transmitted unaltered to profile
viewers” and that the sexually provocative information in the essay section did not bare
“more than a tenuous relationship to the actual questions asked.” Id. See also supra note 52
(providing the CDA’s definition of “interactive content provider”); supra note 50 (providing
the CDA’s definition of “interactive computer service”).
62
Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537 (E.D. Va. 2003). One
provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination and segregation in places
of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006). The statute states in part:
(a) Equal access. All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in
this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of
race, color, religion, or national origin.
(b) Establishments affecting interstate commerce or supported in their
activities by State action as places of public accommodation; lodgings;
facilities principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
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Inc. argued that the statute treated the interactive computer service as
“the owner of a place of public accommodation,” the court found that
the plaintiff was attempting to treat the interactive computer service as a
publisher in violation of Section 230(c).63
Similarly, in 2006, a U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania broadened
the Good Samaritan provision’s grant of immunity to include protection

premises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition or entertainment; other
covered establishments.
Id. § 2000a(a)–(b). Noah, a Muslim, participated in faith-based chat rooms and on several
occasions was barraged with vulgar, religiously discriminatory remarks written by other
AOL members. Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 535. At the time of the action, AOL had thirty
million subscribers and provided a variety of online services, including real time chat
rooms where subscribers could chat via instant text messages. Id. at 534. For example,
Noah alleged that “[o]n July 18, 1999 ‘SARGON I’ wrote ‘Qura’n lies about everything—a
Satan made verses of darkness and destruction!’, ‘Mohammed was no shit, only a killer,
thief, a liar and a adulterer!’, and ‘BYE STUPID MUSLIMS . . . ALL GO TO HELL.’” Id. at
535. Even though Noah reported every incident to AOL, he claimed that AOL did nothing
to eliminate the harassment in the Muslim chat rooms. Id. Noah brought a class action
lawsuits against AOL under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 resulting from AOL’s failure to
enforce the community guidelines within its member agreement. Id. The member
agreement was a “legal document that details [a member’s] rights and obligations as an
AOL member.” Id. The pertinent community guidelines provided:
You will be considered in violation of the Terms of Service if you (or
others using your account) do any of the following: . . . [h]arass,
threaten, embarrass, or do anything else to another member that is
unwanted. This means: . . . don’t attack their race, heritage, etc. . . .
Transmit or facilitate distribution of content that is harmful, abusive,
racially or ethnically offensive, vulgar, sexually explicit, or in a
reasonable person’s view, objectionable . . . . Disrupt the flow of chat
in chat rooms with vulgar language, abusiveness . . . .
Id. at 536. The member agreement stated that AOL could take action, including
termination of accounts, against those who violated the terms of service. Id.
63
261 F. Supp. 2d at 538. The district court reasoned that “[a]n examination of the injury
claimed by plaintiff and the remedy he seeks clearly indicates that his Title II claim seeks to
‘place’ AOL ‘in a publisher’s role.’” Id. Noah also contended that Section 230(c) did not
apply to actions brought under federal civil rights statutes, but the court found that Section
230(c)’s “expansive language grants a broad immunity limited only by specific statutory
exclusions, none of which is applicable here.” Id. at 539. The court added:
Nor can it be plausibly argued that § 230 is limited to immunity from
state law claims for negligence or defamation. Such a limitation is
flatly contradicted by § 230’s exclusion of some specific federal claims.
Those exclusions would be superfluous were § 230 immunity
applicable only to certain state claims. Moreover, the exclusion of
federal criminal claims, but not federal civil rights claims, clearly
indicates, under the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that
Congress did not intend to place federal civil rights claims outside the
scope of § 230 immunity.
Id. (emphasis added).
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from invasion of privacy and negligence claims.64 The Parker court
found that Section 230 barred the plaintiff’s claims because the
interactive computer service was not an information content provider as
defined by the CDA.65 Nevertheless, nearly all courts that have
addressed the application of the Good Samaritan provision have
followed Zeran’s holding that the CDA provides immunity to interactive
computer services from claims that treat the computer service as a
publisher of third-party information.66

64
Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500 (E.D. Pa. 2006). Roy Parker was an
author who claimed that Google should be held liable for defamation and invasion of
privacy because it archived false statements about him posted by Google group users,
provided a search function that returned a list of websites containing his name, and
continued to cache such websites after being notified that they were defamatory. Id.
Google operates a popular website that allows users to search the World Wide Web for
websites, images, and documents. Id. at 496; see Google, http://www.google.com (last
visited Oct. 24, 2009). In its intricate search process, Google makes a copy of each website
and stores it in a storage tool called a cache and provides a link to the cache when listing
search results for its users. Parker, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 496. Google also operates a multitude
of user bulletin boards. See Google Groups, http://groups.google.com (last visited Oct. 24,
2009). Specifically, Parker claimed that “the act of Google users putting in a search query
of his name [led] Google to produce a list of websites in which his name [appeared], thus
creating what he [called] ‘an unauthorized biography . . . that [was] an invasion of his right
to privacy.’” Parker, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 500 (internal citation omitted).
65
422 F. Supp. 2d at 500. The court refrained from examining the elements of Parker’s
claim and noted that “each claim revolves around the tortious acts of a third party for
which Parker holds Google accountable by virtue of its archived USENET system, its
website search tool, and its caching system.” Id. Relying on Carafano, the court examined
the intent behind Section § 230, concluding that “Congress granted most Internet services
immunity from liability for publishing false or defamatory material so long as the
information was provided by another party. Id. As a result, Internet publishers are treated
differently from corresponding publishers in print, television and radio.” Id. at 501
(citation omitted). The court reasoned that Google was not an information content
provider because “[i]n each instance raised by Plaintiff's tort claims, Google either
archived, cached, or simply provided access to content that was created by a third party.”
Id.
66
See Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 470–71 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding tort claims
subject to AOL’s immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am.
Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that Section 230 promoted
freedom of speech in the “‘new and burgeoning Internet medium’ by eliminating the
‘threat [of] tort-based lawsuits against interactive services for injury caused by ‘the
communications of others.’”) (citing Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir.
1997)); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
(holding the CDA prevents causes of action that hold interactive service providers liable for
information generated by third parties); PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d
1069, 1071 (D.S.D. 2001) (reasoning that Congress enacted Section 230 to protect
information distributors and publishers from liability for third party defamation); Doe v.
Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 2001) (stating that the Zeran court’s analysis of
the congressional purpose behind Section 230 was proper).
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In contrast, a few courts have rejected the rationale used in Zeran.67
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals questioned Zeran’s
validity after a trial court held the Good Samaritan provision barred a
plaintiff’s Electronic Communications Privacy Act claim.68 The Seventh
67
See MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL
833595, *7–*8 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004). MCW filed a complaint against Badbusinessbureau
for trademark infringement and violations of the Lanham Act.
Id. at *1.
Badbusinessbureau sought a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, citing Section 230(c) of the CDA for
support. Id. at *7. The Texas court held that “Section 230(c) immunity is not so broad as to
extend to an interactive computer service that goes beyond the traditional publisher’s role
and takes an active role in creating or developing the content at issue.” Id. at *8. See also
Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2003) (questioning the rationale in Zeran
because the application of the Good Samaritan provision is inconsistent with its title); cf.
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an
interactive service provider receives full immunity under Section 230(c) so long as a third
party provides the content).
68
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 659–70 (suggesting that the text of Section 230 is illogical when
read in conjunction with its title). The Electronic Communications Privacy Act states in
part that:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any
person who intentionally—
(a) sends through the mail, or sends or carries in interstate or
foreign commerce, any electronic, mechanical, or other device,
knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device
renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications;
(b) manufactures, assembles, possesses, or sells any electronic,
mechanical, or other device, knowing or having reason to know that
the design of such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of
the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications, and that such device or any component thereof has
been or will be sent through the mail or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce; or
(c) places in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other
publication or disseminates by electronic means any advertisement
of—
(i) any electronic, mechanical, or other device knowing the
content of the advertisement and knowing or having reason to
know that the design of such device renders it primarily useful
for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications; or
(ii) any other electronic, mechanical, or other device, where
such advertisement promotes the use of such device for the
purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communications, knowing the content of the
advertisement and knowing or having reason to know that such
advertisement will be sent through the mail or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2512(1) (2006). In GTE Corp., a person installed secret cameras in college locker
rooms, bathrooms, and showers, and several college athletes brought a claim against GTE
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Circuit contested the policy implications of Section 230’s grant of
immunity to interactive computer services regardless of whether they
made an effort to screen offensive content.69 The Seventh Circuit noted
that “a statute’s caption must yield to its text when the two conflict” and
suggested readings that allowed for liability in some situations.70
While district and circuit courts had interpreted the Good Samaritan
provision as it related to tort-based actions, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the judiciary would
soon be faced with yet another collision on the information
superhighway—a conflict between the protection provided by the CDA’s
Good Samaritan provision and the expansive liability imposed by the
advertising provision of the FHA.71

when they discovered the footage on several websites hosted by GTE. 347 F.3d at 656–57.
GTE claimed that Section 230(c) barred the students’ claim and sought a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal. Id. at 657.
69
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 657 (holding that an interactive service provider was not liable
to the college athletes for the display of voyeur photos taken and posted by a user on its
website). The Seventh Circuit addressed Zeran’s validity in dicta, reasoning that “if
[Zeran’s] reading is sound, then § 230(c) as a whole makes ISPs indifferent to the content of
information they host or transmit: whether they do (subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection
(c)(1)) take precautions, there is no liability under either state or federal law?” Id. The
court further questioned Zeran, noting that:
As precautions are costly, not only in direct outlay but also in lost
revenue from the filtered customers, ISPs may be expected to take the
do–nothing option and enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1). Yet §
230(c)—which is, recall, part of the “Communications Decency Act”—
bears the title “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening
of offensive material”, hardly an apt description if its principal effect is
to induce ISPs to do nothing about the distribution of indecent and
offensive materials via their services. Why should a law designed to
eliminate ISPs’ liability to the creators of offensive material end up
defeating claims by the victims of tortious or criminal conduct?
Id.
70
Id. (citing Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1947)). The
Seventh Circuit suggested reading Section 230(c)(1) as a definitional clause as opposed to
interpreting it as immunity from liability:
On this reading, an entity would remain a “provider or user”—and
thus be eligible for the immunity under § 230(c)(2)—as long as the
information came from someone else; but it would become a
“publisher or speaker” and lose the benefit of § 230(c)(2) if it created
the objectionable information. The difference between this reading and
the district court’s is that § 230(c)(2) never requires ISPs to filter
offensive content, and thus § 230(e)(3) would not preempt state laws
or common-law doctrines that induce or require ISPs to protect the
interests of third parties, such as the spied-on plaintiffs, for such laws
would not be “inconsistent with” this understanding of § 230(c)(1).
Id.
71
See infra Part I.D (discussing the conflict between the FHA and the CDA).
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D. At Odds: When the Good Samaritan Provision and the Fair Housing Act
Collide
In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando v. Roommate.com, the Ninth
Circuit was the first to address the conflict between the CDA and the
FHA.72 In Roommate, the trial court found that the CDA did not provide
immunity to the corporate operator of an online roommate-matching
website, an interactive computer service, for the FHA advertising
violations on its website and distinguished between content that was
created solely by third parties and content facilitated by the interactive
computer service.73 In affirming the trial court’s ruling, the Ninth Circuit
See No. CV 03-09386PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, rev’d in part by 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding an interactive computer
service liable for the defamatory content it helped create, but finding immunity for the
defamatory advertisements created entirely by third parties).
73
521 F.3d at 1175. The defendant operated Roommates.com, a website designed to
match people who were renting rooms with people who were searching for roommates. Id.
at 1161. The website made a profit through advertising and premium subscriptions. Id. It
was viewed about a million times each day and displayed approximately one hundred and
fifty thousand postings. Id. In order to become a member of the website, potential
Roommates.com subscribers were required to fill out questionnaires disclosing basic
contact information as well as gender, sexual orientation, and family status and preferences
related to those categories. Id. at 1173. This information then became the user’s profile,
along with an “Additional Comments” section where users could post their own
information as they saw fit. Id. The plaintiff alleged that Roommate had violated the FHA
in three ways: (1) requiring potential subscribers to fill out questionnaires listing
discriminatory housing preferences, (2) posting the answers to the questionnaires on user
profiles and using it as criteria in its search process, and (3) displaying discriminatory
preferences in the “Additional Comments” section on the user profile. Id. at 1164–65, 1173.
The Ninth Circuit found that the Good Samaritan provision did not provide immunity for
Roommate regarding its required questionnaire and the inclusion thereof in user profile
web pages, but that the “Additional Comments” section was “precisely the kind of
situation for which section 230 was designed to provide immunity.” Id. at 1165, 1168, 1174.
The Ninth Circuit held that Roommate could be held liable for violations committed as a
result of the answers on the questionnaire. The court noted that:
Roommate created the questions and choice of answers, and designed
its website registration process around them. Therefore, Roommate is
undoubtedly the ‘information content provider’ as to the questions
and can claim no immunity for posting them on its website, or for
forcing subscribers to answer them as a condition of using its services.
Id. at 1164. See also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the party
who displays content on a website may be liable even if the content was provided by a
third party); cf. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that a website operator was immune under the Good Samaritan provision even
when it provided a questionnaire with pre-populated answers); see supra notes 60–61 and
accompanying text (discussing the Carafano decision). In Roommate, the Ninth Circuit also
considered the development and display of subscribers’ discriminatory questionnaire
answers, noting that the information was meant to help users decide which housing
opportunities were most compatible with their own preferences and to steer searchers in
72
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extensively clarified its decisions in Batzel and Carafano, which appeared
to be contradictory to its holding in Roommate that the interactive
computer service was liable for FHA violations resulting from
questionnaires created by the service, but not for violations contained in
free-form entries created entirely by third parties.74
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit concluded in a similar case that the
Good Samaritan provision immunized an online listing service riddled
with user-generated postings that violated the advertising provision of
the FHA.75 In Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law,
Inc. v. Craigslist, the plaintiffs argued that an online listing service should
be held accountable for FHA violations committed by those who posted

the direction of the best matches based on their criteria. 521 F.3d at 1165. The Ninth
Circuit concluded, however, that Roommate crossed from mere transmitter to developer of
the content by providing pre-populated answers to the questionnaire. Id. at 1166.
Therefore, the court held that “a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls
within the exception to Section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the
conduct.” Id. at 1168.
74
Roommate, 521 F.3d at 1170–72; see notes 58–63 and accompanying text (providing an
in-depth discussion of the decisions in Batzel and Carafano). The Ninth Circuit noted that
part of Batzel’s holding was that an editor does not forfeit Section 230 immunity when
making spelling, grammar, and length-based corrections so long as the editor’s changes do
not contribute to the defamatory content of the message. Id. at 1170. The court further
explained that under Batzel, an editor can become a developer of content, and therefore
precluded from Section 230 immunity, when he publishes material that he believes was not
intended for him to post online. Id. at 1171. The Ninth Circuit stressed that its holding
coincided with Carafano’s rationale that “classif[ying] user characteristics . . . does not
transform [it] into a ‘developer’ of the ‘underlying misinformation.’” Id. at 1172 (citing
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124). In Carafano, the website provided neutral tools to help create
romantic matches that did not violate any statue, whereas Roommates forced subscribers to
disclose characteristics and used the disclosures to match roommates in violation of the
FHA. Id.
75
Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d
666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs presented a laundry list of discriminatory postings on
Craigslist’s Chicago’s housing classifieds sections, including postings such as “NO
MINORITIES” or “Only Muslims” by users who clearly did not meet the “Mrs. Murphy
exemption.” Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc ,
641 F. Supp. 2d at 685–86 (N.D. Ill. 2006), a’ffd, Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666. See supra note 23
(explaining the “Mrs. Murphy exemption”). Specifically, the civil rights committee alleged
that Craigslist “publishes housing advertisements on its website that indicate a preference,
limitation, or discrimination, or an intention to make a preference, limitation, or
discrimination, on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, and familial status.”
Craigslist, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 685. Craigslist.com lists classifieds for more than five hundred
and fifty cities in over fifty countries and is a self-proclaimed repository of listings for
“[j]obs, housing, goods, services, romance, local activities, advice—just about anything,
really.” Craigslist FAQ, http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet (last visited Aug. 1,
2009). For Craigslist’s current Chicago housing classifieds, see http://Chicago.craigslist.
org/hhh (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).
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their housing listings on the listing service’s website.76 At trial, the
district court embarked on its own analysis of Section 230’s statutory
construction, rejecting Zeran in favor of its own notion that Section
230(c)(1) “bars those causes of action that would require treating an
[interactive computer service] as a publisher of third party content.”77
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding and
asserted that “the question is not whether Congress gave any thought to
the Fair Housing Act, but whether it excluded Section 3604(c) from the
reach of Section 230(c)(1)” and reasoned that, under Section 230(c)(1), the
plaintiff “cannot sue the messenger just because the message reveals a
third party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.”78
76
461 F. Supp. 2d at 685. Specifically, the civil rights committee argued that the court
should follow a Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) regulation that interpreted
Section 3604(c) as applying to “[w]ritten notices and statements includ[ing] any
applications, flyers, brochures, deeds, signs, banners, posters, billboards, or any documents
used with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.” Id. at 687 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 100.75
(2007)). Bryan Greene, HUD’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Programs,
submitted a memorandum that stated:
Although the CDA does not state an intent to limit liability under the
[FHA] or other civil rights states, some believe that Section 230 of the
CDA gives Internet publishers immunity from lawsuits brought under
federal and state civil rights statutes. However, HUD has concluded
that the CDA does not make Web sites immune from liability under
the [FHA] or from liability under state and local laws that HUD has
certified as substantially equivalent to the [FHA].
Id. at 692 n.9. The court found that Greene’s opinion was non-binding because Congress
did not grant HUD the power to interpret the CDA. Id. at 692.
77
Id. at 693. The district court found the Zeran interpretation contained overbroad
language and failed to take into account the textual differences between Sections 230(c)(1)
and 230(c)(2). Id. at 693–94. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997)).
This explanation implies that Section 230(c)(1)’s immunity applies only
to causes of action that seek to impose liability when an ICS acts like a
professional publisher . . . [and] fails to include ICSs that do not edit, or
choose what to post, but who nonetheless serve as a conduit for thirdparty content.
Craigslist, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 694. Under its new interpretation of Section 230(c)(1), the
district court held that Craigslist was not liable for the FHA violations by virtue of the CDA
because Craigslist was an interactive computer service whose website information
originated “from ‘another information content provider’ . . . [and] to hold Craigslist liable
under Section 3604(c) would be to treat Craigslist as if it were the publisher of third party
content, the plain language of Section 201(c)(1) forecloses CLC’s cause of action.” Id. at 698.
78
Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671–72. In its decision, the Seventh Circuit explained that online
services were a hybrid between classified pages in newspapers, which were included in the
scope of Section 3604(c), and “common carriers such as telephone services, which are
unaffected by [the provision].” Id. at 668. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found that
Congress did not contemplate the FHA when it passed the CDA, stating that “the reason a
legislature writes a general statute is to avoid any need to traipse through the United States
Code and consider all potential sources of liability, one at a time.” Id. at 671. In analyzing
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Some commentators believe the magnitude of the conflict between
the CDA and the FHA is so great that the Supreme Court should take an
active interest in the topic.79 While those who have commented on the
CDA and the FHA do not all agree on the proper resolution, most have
recognized that the judiciary’s current application of the CDA has
several unintended consequences.80 Next, this Note analyzes a potential
the statutory text of the CDA, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that Congress could have used
narrowly restrictive language in Section 230(c)(1) instead of “information” that the court
classified as “the stock in trade of online service providers.” Id. “[T]he actual statute has
the word ‘information.’ That covers ads for housing, auctions of paintings that may have
been stolen by Nazis, biting comments about steroids in baseball, efforts to verify the truth
of politicians’ promises, and everything else that third parties may post on a website.” Id.
The Seventh Circuit also addressed the plaintiff’s argument that Craigslist “caused” the
postings to be made, finding that “[n]othing in the service [C]raigslist offers induces
anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference for discrimination.” Id.
79
See Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 376–78. Klein & Doskow argue that certiorari
for Roommate would likely be granted if sought. Id. at 376. Nevertheless, the commentators
warn that other jurisdictions may be suspicious of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roommate
because ninety percent of the Ninth Circuit cases heard by the Supreme Court in the 2006–
2007 term were reversed. Id. (internal citation omitted). A circuit split is one factor the
Court considers when deciding whether to grant certiorari, and the dissent in Roommate
suggests that one may have been created. Id. at 377–79; see Roommate, 521. F.3d at 1177
(McKeown, J., dissenting); infra note 86 (providing the Supreme Court Rule governing
grants of certiorari). One author compared Roommate and Craiglist, concluding that the
Ninth Circuit’s approach was improper and that the Seventh Circuit’s approach better
reflected the intent of Congress in drafting Section 230(c). J. Andrew Crossett, Note, Unfair
Housing on the Internet: The Effect of the Communications Decency Act on the Fair Housing Act,
73 MO. L. REV. 195, 207–08 (2008).
80
See Shanahan, supra note 22, at 155 (suggesting that the FHA be added to the
exceptions in Section 230(e) of the CDA); Collins, supra note 24, at 1495 (proposing a
revision to Section 230(c) that would create an exception for FHA violations); Robert J.
Aalberts, The Communications Decency Act Trumps Fair Housing: A Collision of Public Policy?,
36 REAL. EST. L. J. v (2007) (arguing that the conflict between the CDA and the FHA should
be resolved by Congress). Other commentators believe the judiciary should be charged
with harmonizing the CDA and the FHA. See Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 376–78
(suggesting the Supreme Court should resolve the conflict); Kurth, supra note 16, at 834–35
(arguing that the judiciary should read Section 230(c) to require a good faith effort by
interactive computer services to screen offensive content before allowing immunity for
FHA violations); see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (Berger, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that the judiciary concerns itself with following the letter of the law and
not what seems morally appropriate). One concern with the current application of the
CDA is that it will nullify the effect of Section 3604(c) as more people abandon traditional
print sources of information in favor of online sources. See Collins, supra note 24, at 1491;
infra Part III.B.1. A second problem with the current application of the CDA is that it
creates special status and an incentive for interactive computer services not to screen
offensive content. Crossett, supra note 79, at 209; infra Part III.B.2. A third concern is that
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits ignored precedent that requires both statutes in conflict to
be given effect in favor of substituting Congressional silence for intent, a judicial exercise
that is frowned upon in many contexts. See Chang, supra note 20, at 1002; Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (establishing the analysis courts should take when faced with a
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circuit split, addresses the unpopular pitfalls of the CDA’s current
application, and weighs the strengths and weaknesses of proposed
solutions to the conflict.81
III. ANALYSIS
Part III of this Note provides a detailed analysis of the conflict
between the Good Samaritan provision of the CDA and the advertising
provision of the FHA.82 Section A addresses whether a circuit split exists
and opines that: (1) the Supreme Court likely would not have granted
certiorari to Roommates or Craigslist if it had been petitioned and (2) that
judicial action should not be used to resolve the conflict between the
FHA and the CDA.83 Section B explores several problems with the
current application of the CDA, including assertions that it eviscerates
the effect of Section 3604(c) of the FHA, encourages interactive service
providers to take no action, is inconsistent with congressional intent, and
leaves victims of housing discrimination with no source of relief.84
Finally, Section C analyzes the proposed solutions to the statutory
conflict, ultimately calling for a specific revision to the Good Samaritan

conflict between federal laws). See also Rosalie Berger Levinson, Misinterpreting “Sounds of
Silence”: Why Courts Should Not Imply Congressional Preclusion of § 1983 Claims, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 796 (2008) (arguing that Congress’s inclusion of administrative or
judicial remedies in a newer statute does not warrant an automatic inference that Congress
intended to deny relief under an older statute); Marguerite M. Sullivan, Note, Brown &
Williamson v. FDA: Finding Congressional Intent Through Creative Statutory Interpretation—A
Departure from Chevron, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 273, 299 (1999) (arguing that congressional
inaction does not equate with congressional policy in determining whether the Food and
Drug Administration may regulate tobacco products); David S. Bogen, Mr. Justice Miller’s
Clause: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 1051,
1068 (2008) (arguing that it is unclear whether a state’s boycott of foreign goods is
consistent with federal law and asserting that “[c]ongressional silence indicates nothing”);
infra Part III.B.3 (arguing that congressional silence should not be construed as intent to
apply CDA immunity to interactive computer services in the context of FHA violations). A
final issue is that immunizing interactive computer services from FHA violations may
leave potential plaintiffs without relief because identifying anonymous defendants can be
an arduous and costly task. Kurth, supra note 16, at 828; infra Part III.B.4. See also Dendrite
Int’l., Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. 2001) (providing a rigorous
standard for determining when an anonymous defendant’s identity may be disclosed).
81
Infra Part III (analyzing the conflict between the FHA and the CDA).
82
Infra Part III (analyzing the conflict between the FHA and the CDA).
83
Infra Part III.A (arguing that no viable circuit split exists between the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits).
84
Infra Part III.B (discussing the negative effects of the CDA’s current application on
victims of FHA violations, on the goals of the FHA, and on public policy).
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provision of the CDA that better reflects congressional intent by limiting
the provision’s application.85
A. A Supreme Court Decision Would Not Resolve the Conflict
In determining whether to grant certiorari, the Supreme Court
considers several factors, including whether “a United States court of
appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another
United States court of appeals on the same important matter.”86 Some
commentators question whether Zeran, Roommate, and Craigslist can coexist and conclude that the Supreme Court would likely have granted
certiorari in Roommate and Craigslist if it had been sought.87
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Roommate can be
reconciled with Zeran and its progeny because Roommate is the only case

Infra Part III.C (weighing the proposed solutions to the conflict between the FHA and
the CDA and calling for a textual revision to the Good Samaritan provision).
86
Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 376–78 (internal citation omitted). The Supreme
Court Rule rule governing considerations for review on certiorari provides:
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for
compelling reasons. The following, although neither controlling nor
fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the
reasons the Court considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in
conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on
the same important matter; has decided an important federal question
in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call
for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court
of last resort or of a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be,
settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a
way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted
error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a
properly stated rule of law.
SUP. CT. R. 10.
87
Crossett, supra note 79, at 207–08 (arguing the existence of a circuit split by contrasting
the rationales employed by the Seventh and Ninth circuits in Craigslist and Roommate,
ultimately finding fault with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the CDA); Klein &
Doskow, supra note 21, at 376–78 (expanding on the dissent’s view in Roommate that “five
Circuits (and many district courts) had interpreted Section 230 as imposing a flat ban on
the imposition of liability on the basis of information provided by third parties” and
speculating that certiorari would likely be granted if sought).
85
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considering the conflict between the FHA and the CDA.88 The Craigslist
and Roommate decisions are not inconsistent because key factual
differences between the cases led the Ninth Circuit to deny immunity for
some of the FHA violations at issue in Roommate.89 While the Ninth
Circuit, in Roommate, found an interactive computer service liable for the
display of discriminatory preferences resulting from the content of its
questionnaires, the court also found the CDA provided the interactive
computer service immunity with regard to free-form entries provided
entirely by third parties, which was a nearly identical scenario resulting
in the same legal outcome as Craigslist.90
Despite the lack of conflict between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits,
some commentators argue that Roommate presented the Supreme Court
with the ideal opportunity to address the conflict between the CDA and
civil rights legislation.91 Assume, arguendo, the Supreme Court had been
given the opportunity and granted certiorari to Roommates or Craigslist.92
88
Roommate, 521 F.2d at 1172, n.33. Judge Kozinski, writing for the Roommate majority,
stated:
The dissent coyly suggests that our opinion “sets us apart from” other
circuits . . . carefully avoiding the phrase “intercircuit conflict.” And
with good reason: No other circuit has considered a case like ours and
none has a case that even arguably conflicts with our holding today.
No case cited by the dissent involves active participation by the
defendant in the creation or development of the allegedly unlawful
content; in each, the interactive computer service provider passively
relayed content generated by third parties, just as in Stratton Oakmont,
and did not design its system around the dissemination of unlawful
content.
Id. (internal citation omitted). According to Klein & Doskow, “[t]he strong public policy
which had been applied uniformly from Zeran forward was subordinated to a policy
overlooked by the drafters of § 230.” Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 377–78.
89
Compare supra note 73 (discussing the facts in Roommate), with supra note 75
(recounting Craigslist’s facts). Klein and Doskow acknowledge the key difference between
Roommate and Craigslist that “one service has, and the other lacks, the offending drop-down
menus.” Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 377. Klein and Doskow focused, however, on
the larger issue of the interpretation of Section 230 and the competing policy interests of the
CDA and FHA, claiming that “[i]n piercing the immunity, the policy against advertising
expressing discriminatory preferences was elevated above the immunity policy expressed
in § 230.” Id.
90
Supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text and notes 75–78 and accompanying text
(discussing the reasoning of Roommate and Craigslist).
91
Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 378 (arguing in part that the CDA’s current state of
affairs may be reason enough for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari). According to
Klein and Doskow, the possible circuit divide may cause those who have been harmed by
housing discrimination online to shop their way into the Ninth Circuit, whereas interactive
computer services want a forum that gives a broad reading to Section 230. Id. “The
consistent holdings prior to [Roommate], and the strength of the immunity policy suggest
the Supreme Court may take interest in this matter.” Id.
92
Supra note 86 (providing the criteria for granting certiorari).
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The Court may have determined which circuit engaged in the proper
analytical process, derived some combination of the two rationales, or
created an entirely new method of analysis to resolve the issue.93
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court may ever weigh in on the
interaction between the FHA and the CDA, the conflict will likely
continue to plague courtrooms with a tug-of-war between text and
policy until Congress takes action, because the heart of the problem lies
within the language of the CDA.94

For a discussion of the Roommate and Craigslist analysis, see supra notes 73–74 and
accompanying text and notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
94
Crossett, supra note 79, at 211 (arguing that it is ultimately Congress’s responsibility to
reconcile the CDA and the FHA). Crossett notes:
the enforcement of the spirit of the law would come at the expense of
the letter of the law, which is an unacceptable result.
This
demonstrates that the courts are not the appropriate mechanism of
change to interpret the two competing statutes. The language of 230(c)
is clear in the result that it demands, but it is a distasteful result and is
inconsistent with the letter of section 3604(c) and with how the FHA
has been interpreted by courts.
Id. at 211. See also Aalberts, supra note 80, at v (noting that Congress is charged with
resolving statutory conflict). “Yet, unless Congress amends the CDA to create another
expressed exception . . . supporters of the FHA . . . will have to rely on the good graces of
[interactive computer services] . . . to assume a moral duty to eliminate or at least temper
the tone of the discriminatory ads.” Id. While it is arguable that courts have on occasion
shaped public policy at the expense of the letter of the law, Chief Justice Berger
summarized the role of the judiciary with a quote from Robert Bolt’s A Man for All Seasons:
The law, Roper, the law. I know what’s legal, not what’s right. And I’ll
stick to what’s legal. . . . . I’m not God. The currents and eddies of
right and wrong, which you find such plain–sailing, I can’t navigate,
I’m no voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh there I’m a
forester . . . . What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to
get after the Devil? . . . And when the last law was down, and the
Devil turned round on you[—]where would you hide, Roper, the laws
all being flat? . . . This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to
coast[—]Man’s laws, not God’s[—]and if you cut them down . . . d’you
really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow
then? . . . Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s
sake.
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (Berger, C.J., dissenting) (internal
citation omitted). But see Kurth, supra note 16, at 834 (arguing that the courts should read
Section 230 as requiring as a prerequisite a good-faith effort to screen offensive content on
the part of interactive computer services before receiving immunity).
93
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B. Why the CDA Should Not Apply to FHA Advertising Violations
1.

Evisceration of Section 3604(c)

Section 3604(c) was designed to reform the housing industry and
eliminate the special dangers associated with housing discrimination.95
Some argue that society has changed its discriminatory practices in
recent years, but the numerous FHA violations following the Hurricane
Katrina disaster in 2005 show that America has not progressed in
eliminating housing bias nearly as far as some would believe.96 While
Section 3604(c) has been particularly strong in preventing discriminatory
print advertisements by imposing publisher liability, the provision has
been unsuccessful in its application to interactive service providers, and
there are no signs of recovery without congressional intervention.97
Moreover, newspaper circulation has seen a steady decline as more
readers and advertisers are taking advantage of the Internet’s popularity
and real-time capabilities.98 Notwithstanding the purposes behind
Section 3604(c), discriminatory housing advertisements will continue
moving into the mainstream, as the Internet has been deemed a “safe
haven” for FHA advertising violations.99 Rampant discrimination in
95
Crossett, supra note 79, at 210 (discussing the purpose of Section 3604(c)); supra note 19
(providing the text of Section 3604(c)); supra note 20 and accompanying text (highlighting
the dangers posed by housing discriminations).
96
Collins, supra note 24, at 1491 (noting that HUD received complaints of housing
discrimination on numerous housing websites designed especially for Hurricane Katrina
victims). In a 2006 hearing before Congress, a HUD administrator said that she feared the
discriminatory advertisements were causing psychological harm and that HUD was
rigorously investigating the allegations. Id. at 1492. During the hearing, a representative
from Massachusetts addressed the reality that Congress may have inadvertently designed
the CDA to provide for the types of violations at issue and requested HUD’s assistance in
drafting corrective legislation if necessary. Id. See also supra note 24 and accompanying text
(providing examples of the discrimination faced by Hurricane Katrina victims).
97
See supra note 24 (listing cases in which Section 3604(c) liability was imposed on media
including newspapers, listing services, and advertising brochures); supra Part II.D
(providing an in-depth discussion of the holdings in Roommate and Craigslist). Some
authors have argued that the conflict between the CDA and FHA should be resolved by a
revision to the CDA. See Shanahan, supra note 22, at 155; Collins, supra note 24, at 1495;
Crossett; supra note 79, at 211. But see Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 376–78 (suggesting
that the Supreme Court may resolve the conflict between the CDA and the FHA); Kurth,
supra note 16, at 834–35 (arguing that the judiciary could reconcile the conflict by
“construing the CDA to require a good faith effort on the part of [interactive computer
services] to implement screening and filtering mechanisms”).
98
Collins, supra note 24, at 1490–91; supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the
circulation decreases that newspapers across America are experiencing because of
competition from online news sources).
99
Sussman, supra note 24, at 215 (arguing that application of the CDA to Section 3604(c)
claims requires immunity for interactive computer services and creates a “safe haven” for
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housing sales and advertising during the 1960s originally drove
Congress to pass Section 3604(c).100 The CDA, however, has turned the
Internet, a mainstream medium, into a hotbed for housing
discrimination by allowing interactive computer services to circumvent
Section 3604(c), thereby bringing the state of the law full circle and
eviscerating the FHA advertising provision.101
2.

Special Status for Internet Companies and the Do-Nothing Mentality

Another criticism of allowing the CDA to provide immunity for an
interactive computer service when its users have committed FHA
violations is that Internet-based companies can escape liability in
situations where traditional companies are held accountable.102
Although some interactive computer services receive a voluminous
number of user posts each day and have a minimal number of
employees, those services should not be held to a different standard
from similar traditional companies who maintain a staff sufficient to
ensure compliance with the FHA and other applicable laws.103 Even if an
discrimination on the Internet); supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the
special dangers sought to be avoided by Section 3604(c)).
100
See generally Part II.A (discussing the development of the FHA).
101
Supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the FHA); supra note
24 and accompanying text (illustrating the types of discrimination faced by the victims of
Hurricane Katrina who were displaced from their homes); supra Part II.D (discussing the
decisions in Roommate and Craigslist).
102
Crossett, supra note 79, at 209. “[E]nforcing the CDA against FHA claims creates an
anomalous result, because immunizing websites results in newspapers being held liable for
identical advertisements posted online, even if on that same newspaper’s website.” Id. See
supra note 24 (providing a discussion of cases where the court extended liability to
newspapers, listing services, and advertising brochures for publishing discriminatory
housing advertisements in violation of the FHA). The Fourth Circuit allowed the most
extensive liability for intermediaries, finding that the FHA advertising provision “was
intended to apply to newspapers as well as “any other publishing medium.” United States
v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972). In Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit addressed an
amicus brief submitted in support of the plaintiff that illustrated the judiciary’s willingness
to apply the FHA to various media. 519 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, the
Seventh Circuit was not persuaded by the brief, finding that “[o]nline services are in some
respects like the classified pages of newspapers, but in others they operate like common
carriers such as telephone services, which are unaffected by § 3604(c) because they neither
make nor publish any discriminatory advertisement, text message, or conversation that
may pass over their networks.” Id.
103
Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 343 (arguing that online services should be
subjected to the same expenses as traditional companies). Klein and Doskow explained:
There is no reason to exempt Internet roommate-matching
services from having to bear the same costs that are borne by
newspapers and other publishers who decide to enter the real estate
advertising market, who must then police the contents of their real
estate advertisements for illegal content. The Internet permits the
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Internet service does not have the human capital to manually edit
postings, there are several alternative methods of monitoring third-party
posts to ensure housing advertisements are valid under the FHA, such as
automated screening software and user-based notification programs.104
Furthermore, the CDA’s current application actually provides
interactive computer services an incentive not to screen discriminatory
website operator to disseminate much more information, at much
lower cost, than a traditional publisher . . . . In this way, those who
enjoy commercial benefits from bringing together housing providers
and housing seekers can cooperate to ensure that the antidiscrimination laws are not violated.
Id. (internal citations omitted). In Roommate, the Ninth Circuit noted that Roommates.com
had about one hundred and fifty thousand active listings and received more than a million
page views every day, but did not consider staffing issues in its holding. 521 F.3d 1157,
1161 (9th Cir. 2008). In Craigslist, however, the Seventh Circuit specifically addressed
Craigslist’s understaffing and posited that the costs of maintaining editorial control over
posts would be too burdensome. 519 F.3d at 668–69.
An online service could hire a staff to vet the postings, but that
would be expensive. . . . . Every month more than 30 million notices
are posted to the [C]raigslist system. Fewer than 30 people, all based
in California, operate the system, which offers classifieds and forums
for 450 cities. It would be necessary to increase that staff (and the
expense that the users must bear) substantially to conduct the sort of
editorial review that [plaintiff] demands.
Id.
104
Chang, supra note 20, at 1007 (arguing that the FHA does not overburden interactive
computer services and advocating the use of filtering technology). Chang stated:
Because such clear guidelines exist as to words and combinations
of words that would likely violate § 3604(c), [interactive computer
services] could utilize available filtering technology to automatically
prescreen discriminatory text-based housing listings while minimizing
the need for manual review. The same filtering technology currently
used to block obscene language could be configured to block
discriminatory words and phrases from classified housing listings.
Id. Chang concedes that the technology “is not foolproof and may be under- or
overinclusive,” but suggests that the problem could be cured by utilizing advanced
word-search techniques or by implementing a program that allows users to report
discriminatory postings to the website operators. Id. But see Craigslist, 519 F.3d at
668–69 (finding fault with automated filters). “[S]creening, though lawful, is hard.
Simple filters along the lines of ‘postings may not contain the words ‘white”’ can’t
work. . . . [A]utomated filters and human reviewers may be equally poor at sifting
good from bad postings unless the discrimination is blatant; both false positives and
false negatives are inevitable.” Id. Other commentators have suggested placing a
banner advertisement on the user forum that contains the pertinent provisions of the
FHA or creating drop down menus that only allow information permissible under the
FHA. Klein & Doskow, supra note 21, at 343. But see Collins, supra note 24, at 1497–98
(arguing that user-based notification programs may be ineffective because they do not
eliminate the harm caused by a discriminatory advertisement during the time it is
available to the public and the program assumes that users know what type of content
constitutes discrimination under the FHA).
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advertisements because they are less likely to face liability if they take a
hands-off approach.105 A do-nothing mentality allows some interactive
computer services to shirk their ethical duty of ensuring that housing
listings are non-discriminatory without fear of repercussion and directly
contradicts the congressional intent behind the Good Samaritan
provision.106
3.

Silence and Intent Treated as the Same

Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits erred by construing Congress’s
silence as an indication that the FHA was not excluded from the CDA’s
immunity provision.107 As it stands, the CDA effectively preempts
Section 3604(c) of the FHA’s liability for intermediaries when interactive
computer services are involved by providing near-absolute immunity for
the intermediaries for clear FHA violations.108 In other contexts, the
Supreme Court has attempted to adhere to the provisions of both
statutes when resolving conflicts between two federal laws.109 Yet, even

Crossett, supra note 79, at 210 (arguing that the Good Samaritan provision promotes
inefficiency). Crossett asserts that “[b]ecause a website may avoid liability under the FHA
by turning its website into a free-for-all (the less oversight, the greater chance of
immunity), online housing consumers will be left to negotiate thousands of unfiltered
advertisements, like on Craigslist.” Id. Crossett argues that this method is inefficient for
both web-surfers and the companies who want to serve them and will ultimately lead to
greater violations of the FHA. Id. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (discussing
the Seventh Circuit’s questioning of the logic behind the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Zeran
and the application that appeared to create a disincentive for interactive computer services
to use filtering technology).
106
Kurth, supra note 16, at 835. “Congress used the terms ‘protection for blocking and
screening’ seven times in the rather brief § 230 of the CDA. This notion was at the heart of
the legislation—that immunity was intended for those Web site hosts who made some
good faith effort to curb malicious practices.” Id. (footnote omitted). See supra notes 47–51
and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the CDA); infra Part III.B.3
(expounding the shortcomings of the CDA’s application with regard to congressional
intent).
107
Chang, supra note 20, at 1001. Chang argues that the congressional silence about the
CDA’s implications on fair housing and the lack of an irreconcilable conflict between the
laws means that the courts should adhere to the FHA’s broad imposition of liability. Id.;
infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text (arguing that congressional silence within the
context of two federal laws should be treated the same way as when the situation involves
a federal law and a state law).
108
Supra note 24 and accompanying text (illustrating how the FHA’s expansive liability
applies to both the principal discriminator and the intermediaries); supra Part II.D
(discussing Roommate and Craigslist, two cases where the CDA’s immunity trumped FHA’s
liability for intermediaries).
109
Chang, supra note 20, at 1001 (arguing that the judiciary should attempt to give both
statutes effect). Also, in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) the Court held:
105
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when a dispute arises as to whether a federal law was meant to preempt
a particular area of state law, which under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution must give way to conflicting federal law,
courts still may apply preemption only where there is a clear
congressional intent to preempt state law.110
Applying this framework supports the argument that the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits erred in their analyses because Congress’s failure to
contemplate the FHA while drafting the CDA is a far cry from clear
congressional intent to preempt the FHA advertising provision in certain
situations through application of the CDA.111 In Craigslist, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that the purpose of drafting a general statute was so the
legislature need not “traipse through the United States Code” to consider
all possible sources of liability and improperly treated congressional
silence as intent to include the FHA within the CDA’s immunity
provision.112 While the Ninth Circuit chose to address the issue of
congressional intent through expressio unius est exclusio alterius in

In the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to
repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is
when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable . . . .
The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among
Congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
Congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.
“When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give
effect to both if possible” . . . . The intention of the legislature to repeal
“must be clear and manifest.”
Id. at 550–51 (internal citations omitted). Chang’s commentary provides an in-depth
analysis of the possibility of reconciling the CDA and the FHA, ultimately concluding that
the application of the FHA’s advertising provision to interactive computer services does
not frustrate the purpose of the CDA. See Chang, supra note 20, at 1003–08; see also Kurth,
supra note 16, at 835 (arguing that the judiciary should solve the conflict by reading a good
faith screening requirement into the Good Samaritan provision).
110
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 366–67 (providing an overview of the Supreme
Court’s preemption jurisprudence). Chemerinsky explains:
The problem, of course, is that Congress’s intent, especially as to the
scope of preemption, is rarely expressed or clear. Therefore, although
the Court purports to be finding congressional intent, it often is left to
make guesses about purpose based on fragments of statutory
language, random statements in the legislative history, and the degree
of detail of the federal regulation.
Id. at 367.
111
Supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text (discussing the CDA’s legislative history).
112
Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666,
671 (7th Cir. 2008). The Seventh Circuit perceived the question to be “not whether
Congress gave any thought to the Fair Housing Act, but whether it excluded § 3604(c)
from the reach of 230(c)(1).” Id. Cf. supra note 54 (discussing the Central District of
California’s application of the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to the CDA).
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Roommate, its reasoning was equally unsound because the FHA was not
even on the congressional radar when the CDA and its exceptions were
drafted.113 That said, the FHA was a landmark piece of legislation
designed to protect compelling interests in equal housing opportunities,
and nothing in the legislative history of the CDA remotely suggests that
Congress actually intended the CDA to erase such an important step in
equality by providing immunity for advertising violations, no matter
their form.114 The legislative history of the CDA reveals several purposes
behind the inclusion of the Good Samaritan provision, and, if anything,
the congressional silence on the topic of its application to the FHA
illustrates that Congress did not intend for the CDA to provide immunity
for interactive computer services in their role as intermediaries for
discriminatory housing advertisements.115
Supra note 54 (discussing the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its
application in Roommate); notes 47–51 and accompanying text (providing an overview of
the CDA’s legislative history).
114
Supra notes 15–20 and accompanying text (discussing the history and purposes of the
FHA); notes 47–51 and accompanying text (providing the legislative history of the CDA).
Congress listed five policy reasons for enacting the CDA, one of which was “to remove
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that
empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2006). The Good Samaritan provision fits squarely within
that particular policy goal. Furthermore, in Craigslist, the district court for the Northern
District of Illinois recounted some of the goals Congress discussed as the CDA passed
through the legislature, specifically that the statute “‘was enacted, in part, to maintain the
robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government
interference in the medium to a minimum.’” Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights Under
the Law v. Craigslist, Inc. 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 689 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (quoting Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997)). The district court relied heavily on the
Zeran court’s assessment that Congress was also concerned about the chilling effect that
tort-based lawsuits have on free speech. Id.; supra note 57 and accompanying text
(providing a discussion of the Zeran courts discernment of the nongressional intent behind
the CDA). The district court also noted that Congress made the policy choice not to impose
tort liability on intermediaries and reasoned that it would be impossible for interactive
computer services to screen millions of messages. See Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 689
(reasoning that “‘Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and
chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.’” (quoting Zeran,
129 F.3d at 331)).
115
Supra, notes 45–51 and accompanying text (explaining that in enacting the CDA,
Congress was concerned with immunizing interactive computer services that utilized
screening techniques to block offensive conduct and eliminating a flood of tort-based
litigation in the wake of the decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995)). The notion that silence should not be construed by
courts as indicative of Congressional intent is not unique to the conflict between the FHA
and the CDA, as commentators have made similar arguments regarding other areas of law.
See Levinson, supra note 80, at 796 (arguing that congressional silence about administrative
or judicial remedies in a statute does not warrant an automatic inference that Congress
intended to eliminate Section 1983 relief in conjunction with certain statues); Sullivan, supra
113
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Victims May Be Denied a Remedy

Those who support the CDA’s current dominance over the FHA
argue that victims of housing discrimination are barred only from
recovering from intermediary interactive computer services for thirdparty online housing violations and that the avenue of recovery against
the third-party discriminators remains available.116 While this argument
is plausible, the ability to post anonymous messages on the Internet may
leave victims of housing discrimination without a readily available
defendant.117 The burdensome task of identifying interactive computer
service users may prove to be so costly and time-consuming that victims
of housing discrimination will be discouraged from pursuing a
remedy.118 If a victim cannot obtain a violator’s identity on his or her
note 80, at 299 (arguing that Congressional inaction should not preclude the Food and
Drug Administration from regulating tobacco products); Bogen, supra note 80, at 1068
(asserting that “[c]ongressional silence indicates nothing” when determining whether a
state’s boycott of foreign goods is consistent with federal law).
116
Supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text (discussing the broad application of the
FHA advertising provision); supra note 52 (containing the text of the Good Samaritan
provision, which mentions only “interactive computer services” and not the third party
discriminators).
117
Kurth, supra note 16, at 828. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., a case in which an anonymous posting resulted in the plaintiff
receiving a flood of angry phone calls); supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text
(providing an explanation of Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., a case in which a woman
received unsolicited phone calls from users of an online dating service because an
anonymous user created a false advertisement using the woman’s name and likeness);
supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text (discussing Stratton Oakmont, where an
anonymous user posted allegedly defamatory statements about an investment banking
company). Kurth argues that the same type of instance could arise in the context of fair
housing. Kurth, supra note 16, at 828. “[I]ndividuals who find individual user violations of
the Fair Housing Act on Websites such as Craigslist would have to go through the
burdensome task of affirmatively identifying the individuals who posted the questionable
ads, which may have been posted anonymously, and then filing suit against each
individual.” Id.
118
Kurth, supra note 16, at 828. One commentator provided insight into how difficult it
may be to identify a user of a website such as Craigslist or Roommates.com. Collins, supra
note 24, at 1494. According to Collins:
Although it is true that a housing advertisement must include contact
information in order for prospective buyers and renters to express
their interest, some [interactive computer services] protect their users’
anonymity by hiding their email addresses. If an interested party
wants to contact the person who posted an advertisement, he or she
sends an email to a temporary, anonymous address that the
[interactive computer service] specially created for the advertisement.
The email is automatically forwarded from the anonymous email
address to the user’s actual address. The person responding to the
advertisement never sees the advertiser’s actual contact information
unless the advertiser responds via email. In this way, online housing
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own, the victim must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination
and then pursue additional litigation to compel the disclosure of the
defendant’s identity.119 Commentators suggest that the difficulty of
identifying individual online discriminators is a key reason why
interactive computer services should be held liable for their users’
discriminatory housing advertisements.120 Next, Section C explores and
evaluates solutions posed by various legal commentators, focusing on
the strengths, weaknesses, and policy concerns of each.121
advertisers remain much more anonymous than traditional print
advertisers, who generally have no choice but to provide an accurate
phone number or email address.
Id.
119
Kurth, supra note 16, at 828. Kurth argues that “potential plaintiffs might be deterred
from filing lawsuits given the increased costs and the seeming impossibility of identifying
the faceless Internet offender.” Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court is credited with
positing the dominant analysis used when a plaintiff wishes to unmask an anonymous
defendant. Id. The court produced the following analysis:
We offer the following guidelines to trial courts when faced with
an application by a plaintiff for expedited discovery seeking an order
compelling an ISP to honor a subpoena and disclose the identity of
anonymous Internet posters who are sued for allegedly violating the
rights of individuals, corporations or businesses . . .
[T]he trial court should first require the plaintiff to undertake
efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a
subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, and withhold
action to afford the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable
opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application . . . .
The court shall also require the plaintiff to identify and set forth
the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster that
plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech . . . .
The complaint and all information provided to the court should
be carefully reviewed to determine whether plaintiff has set forth a
prima facie cause of action against the fictitiously-named anonymous
defendants . . . .
Finally, assuming the court concludes that the plaintiff has
presented a prima facie cause of action, the court must balance the
defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against
the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the
disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity to allow the plaintiff
to properly proceed.
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. 2001).
120
Kurth, supra note 16, at 828. “[I]f Web sites such as Craigslist maintained a degree of
control in preventing the publication of FHA-violative housing ads, offenders could be
prevented from [disseminating] their discriminatory housing preferences on such major
Internet databases.” Id. See Collins, supra note 24, at 1493–95 (arguing that interactive
computer services are ideal candidates for gatekeeper liability because they are easier to
identify than anonymous users and can utilize filtering systems to minimize violations).
121
Infra Part III.C (discussing the suggestions of allowing the judiciary to solve the
conflict between the FHA and the CDA, adding the FHA to the already developed
exceptions list, and amending the text of Section 230(c)).
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C. Weighing the Alternatives
Although the application of the CDA to online FHA violations is a
relatively new practice, three commentators present solutions to the
conflict, which include allowing the courts to harmonize the FHA and
the CDA by reading a good faith screening requirement into the text of
the CDA, adding an FHA exception to Section 230(e), or revising Section
230(c) to exclude FHA violations.122 One commentator suggests the
judiciary can resolve the conflict between the CDA and the FHA by
granting immunity to interactive computer services for third-party FHA
advertising violations only after a showing of a good-faith effort to block
the discriminatory content.123 This approach poses a minimal threat to
free speech on the Internet and allows for a case-by-case analysis that
adheres to the Supreme Court’s practice of trying to equally enforce
conflicting federal statutes.124 Yet, this solution may not be viable in
jurisdictions that firmly adhere to Zeran or shun the idea of judicial
activism, as this approach overlooks the text of the law in favor of policy
concerns.125
In addition, two legal commentators who address the discourse
between the CDA and the FHA concluded that Congress should resolve
the conflict by amending the CDA, but posited revisions to different
Infra Part III.C.
Kurth, supra note 16, at 834–35 (arguing that the suggested application also embodies
the legislative intent behind the CDA and that “[w]ith this interpretation enunciated, courts
could take individual cases on their facts to determine whether the challenged Website has
met this standard and qualified for immunity”).
124
Kurth, supra note 16, at 835 (noting that the judiciary’s case-by-case determination
would result in restriction only for discriminatory housing advertisements). Kurth asserts
that “[t]he fact that a user who posts an ad seeking to rent an apartment to ‘Whites only’
. . . . might have that post removed by screening software, does not mean that the same
user is not free to open his own Web site devoted to ‘White power.’” Id. See Chang, supra
note 20, at 1001–08 (arguing that FHA liability should apply to interactive computer
services because the FHA and CDA can be reconciled); supra note 109 and accompanying
text (discussing the analysis used by the Supreme Court when the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act ran afoul of an older statute that allowed the Bureau of Indian Affairs to
give a preference to Native Americans in its hiring decisions).
125
Supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (providing a detailed discussion of the
Fourth Circuit’s decision and rationale in Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.). While the Seventh
Circuit questioned the Zeran court’s decision to construe the CDA in a way that conflicted
with the statute’s subtitles, the contentions were posed in dicta, which has minimal
persuasive power. See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that the
Good Samaritan provision seems to provide immunity to interactive computer services
regardless of whether they attempt to screen offensive content); supra note 68 (providing a
discussion of GTE Corp.). Some justices, however, do not take a proactive stance and
believe that their role is to follow the letter of the law, regardless of its illogical structure or
impractical effects. Supra note 94 (quoting then Chief Justice Burger’s famous dissent from
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill).
122
123
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sections of the statute.126 One author suggests in his 2007 Note that
Congress should add the FHA to Section 230(e), an explicit list of
exceptions to the CDA.127 While creating a special exception for the FHA
has some of the same strengths as Kurth’s proposition (suggesting the
Court could resolve the conflict through a new interpretation of the
CDA) and would likely be the quickest resolution to the conflict, it is a
reactive step that ignores the CDA’s textual shortcomings.128
Another commentator advocates the creation of an exception for the
FHA by combining elements of the CDA and FHA in a specific revision
to the text of Section 230(c)(1).129 Although this suggestion is a viable
solution to the conflict between the CDA and the FHA, it contains the
same deficiencies as Shanahan’s proposal.130 Furthermore, Collins
recognizes that his solution is subject to several criticisms, including
overreaction by interactive computer services, overburdening interactive
computer services, and Congress’s acceptance of Zeran’s broad grant of
immunity.131 Finally, Part IV of this Note suggests a remedy to the
conflict between the FHA and the CDA—revisions to Section 230(c)(1)

126
Shanahan, supra note 22, at 155 (recommending that Congress add the FHA to the list
of exceptions in the CDA); Collins, supra note 24, at 1495 (proposing a revision to Section
230(c)(1) that would create an exception for the FHA).
127
Shanahan, supra note 22, at 155. For the text of Section 230(e) see supra note 54.
128
Kurth, supra note 16, at 834–35 (suggesting that the judiciary can solve the conflict
through a new interpretation of the CDA); supra note 124 and accompanying text
(providing a discussion of the strengths of Kurth’s solution). See supra notes 69–70 and
accompanying text (discussing the inconsistencies between the subtitles of the CDA and its
application in FHA cases); supra Part III.B.3 (analyzing how the judiciary’s application of
the CDA mistakenly construes congressional silence and is contrary to the CDA’s
legislative intent).
129
Collins, supra note 24, at 1495. Collins argues that Section 230(c)(1) should read “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider, except for
notices, statements, or advertisements with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.” Id.
130
Supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the weaknesses in adding the FHA
to the Section 230(e) exception list).
131
Collins, supra note 24, at 1495–98. Collins also presents counterarguments to the
perceived weaknesses in his suggested statutory revision. Id. He acknowledges that
interactive computer services may become overzealous in their blocking of potentially
discriminatory content, but that the practice can be overcome by allowing users to revise
their screened advertisements in a manner consistent with Section 3604(c). Id. at 1496.
Collins negates the argument that interactive computer services might be overburdened by
noting that they would be held to the same legal standard as traditional print media. Id. at
1497; see supra note 24 (providing several cases imposing FHA liability on newspapers,
listing services, and advertising brochures). Lastly, Collins considers whether Congress
had accepted Zeran by passing the Dot Kids Act, but concludes that the new legislation has
no bearing on the CDA and does not constitute acceptance of Zeran. Id. at 1498.
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that clarify the scope of its application, are proactive in nature, and avoid
the pitfalls inherent in other proposed solutions.132
IV. PROPOSED REVISION
Although some scholars suggest revising the CDA to create an
exception for FHA violations, a more appropriate revision is needed, one
that eliminates exceptions and refines the text of the Good Samaritan
provision to state its intended use.133 First, the list of exceptions in
Section 230(e) of the CDA should be stricken.134 A list of exceptions,
such as the one currently included in the CDA, opens the door to
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a canon of statutory construction that
assumes any item not on the list was intentionally excluded by
Congress.135 Yet, such an assumption is erroneous when exclusion
results from mere oversight as opposed to intent.136 Rather than include
a list of exceptions, Congress can accomplish the same end by adding a
provision to Section 230(c) that limits its application to only those
instances included within the CDA’s text.137
The Author’s proposed resolution is centered on the following
revisions to the Good Samaritan provision of the CDA:
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and
screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker:
For the purposes of determining defamation liability,
[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or

Infra Part IV (suggesting a revision to Section 230(c)(1) that is consistent with
congressional intent and limits the application of the Good Samaritan provision).
133
Infra Part IV (explaining this Author’s proposed revisions to the CDA); see supra Part
III.C (analyzing solutions posed by other legal scholars, including adding the FHA to the
exceptions list under Section 230(e), revising the Good Samaritan provision to include an
exception for the FHA, and allowing the judiciary to resolve the conflict through a new
interpretation of the CDA).
134
Supra note 54 (containing the text of 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2006), which includes
exceptions for specific criminal provisions, intellectual property laws, consistent state laws,
and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act).
135
Supra note 54 and accompanying text (providing Sutherland’s description of the canon
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and illustrating how the Ninth Circuit applied it to the
CDA).
136
Supra Part III.B.3 (arguing that congressional silence should not be construed as
intent).
137
Infra note 138 and accompanying text (containing the Author’s proposed revisions to
the Good Samaritan provisions).
132
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speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.
(2) Other [c]ivil liability:
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action [] taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing,
or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available
to information content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (A).
(C) “Any action taken in good faith” as used in
paragraph (A) means filtering software, specialized
search engines, a reporting scheme, or any other
method reasonably calculated to restrict access to the
material described in paragraph (A).
(3) This provision shall have no other applications aside
from those provided in paragraphs (1) and (2).138
Commentary
This framework allows for clearer application of the Good Samaritan
provision and is more compatible with the congressional intent behind
the enactment of the CDA because it provides immunity for defamatory
statements posted by third parties, immunizes interactive computer
services that make a good-faith attempt to screen offensive content, and
limits the application of the CDA to only the uses provided within the
text.139 The revisions proposed to Section 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2) draw a
distinct line between the two subsections and eliminate the confusion
associated with determining how the two subsections interact with each
other.140
Under the Author’s suggested revisions, Section 230(c)(1) would
unequivocally prevent interactive computer services from being treated
138
The Author’s original revisions are italicized. The remainder of the statutory text is
from 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
139
Supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text (discussing Congresses intent behind the
enactment of the CDA).
140
Supra note 77 (providing the district court for the Northern District of Illinois’s
analysis of the interaction between Sections 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2)).
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as publishers of content provided by third parties only in defamation
actions.141 The revisions to Section 230(c)(1) are designed to provide
absolute immunity in defamation actions while striking an adequate
balance between the unfair imposition of liability on interactive
computer services and censorship on the Internet.142
The proposed revisions of Section 230(c)(2) provide civil immunity,
most likely from First Amendment claims, for interactive computer
services that make a good-faith effort to restrict access to patently
offensive or obscene materials on their websites or forums.143 Even
though Rachel Kurth’s position that a good-faith effort to restrict
offensive content should be an implied requirement for immunity, this
Note concludes that making the requirement explicit in the statute is
preferable to creative statutory interpretation by the ever-changing
judiciary.144 The proposed revisions of Section 230(c)(2)(C) reinforce the
“good faith” requirement by providing examples of means available to
restrict content.145 Nevertheless, the phrase “reasonably calculated to
restrict access” allows for flexibility to account for the financial
capabilities of individual interactive computer services.146 Lastly, the
proposed addition of Section 230(c)(3) to the CDA replaces the need for a
list of exceptions by clearly stating the Good Samaritan provision shall
have no use other than those listed in Section 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2).147
This Note’s suggested revisions serve two purposes: (1) eliminating
near-absolute immunity provided to interactive computer services for
third-party FHA violations and (2) providing a proactive solution to the
current conflict that is workable for future lawmakers. While adding the
FHA to the exceptions list in Section 230(e) or amending the text in
Section 230(c) to create an exception for the FHA would solve the current
141
Supra text accompanying note 138 (containing the Author’s proposed revisions to the
Good Samaritan provision); supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text (discussing Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), a case in
which an Internet service provider was held liable for defamatory messages posted by
third parties on its “Money Talk” message board).
142
Supra text accompanying note 138 (providing the Author’s suggested revisions to the
CDA); see 141 CONG. REC. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (noting Congressional concern for
the protection of free speech on the Internet).
143
Supra text accompanying note 138 (containing the Author’s proposed statutory
solution to the conflict between the CDA and the FHA).
144
Kurth, supra note 16, at 834–35 (arguing the judiciary should be allowed to read a
good faith requirement into the current text of the CDA).
145
Supra text accompanying note 138 (listing the Author’s proposed changes to the
CDA).
146
Supra text accompanying note 138 (listing this author’s proposed changes to the
CDA).
147
Supra text accompanying note 138 (listing this author’s proposed changes to the
CDA).
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conflict between the FHA and the CDA, the Author’s proposed revisions
of Section 230(c) also contemplate the potential for future misuses of the
CDA.148 With such a vast array of bills and a limited amount of time
during any given legislative session, it is unreasonable to assume that
Congress could ever contemplate every possible misuse of a given
statutory provision.149 Rather than wasting congressional time and
resources amending the CDA each time a defendant attempts to utilize
the CDA in an unforeseen manner, new applications are presumed
invalid under the proposed amendment to the statute.150 While
Congress may always amend any portion of the CDA that no longer
serves its purpose or is inconsistent with contemporary attitudes and
needs, the proposed revisions to the CDA encourage efficiency in
drafting, which eliminates the need for the same provision to be
repeatedly amended after its initial passage.151 Furthermore, the
proposed revisions put the application of the CDA in the hands of
Congress instead of the judiciary and allows for harmonious coexistence
between the FHA and the CDA.152
V. CONCLUSION
Housing discrimination is an egregious form of prejudice that
perpetuates stereotypes and causes psychological harm.
Despite
congressional efforts to eliminate the expression of such prejudices
through the enactment of the FHA, housing discrimination remains
prevalent on the Internet. Although a provision of the FHA extends
liability for discriminatory housing advertisements to intermediaries,
defendants have successfully used the Good Samaritan provision of the
CDA to immunize interactive computer services from liability for thirdparty FHA violations posted on their websites and forums.
The CDA was enacted more than twenty-five years after the FHA,
but congressional documents indicate that the legislators never
contemplated a potential conflict between the FHA and the CDA. The
CDA, a law that was intended to prevent a flood of defamation litigation
and protect interactive computer services that make a good-faith effort to

148
Supra Part III.C (presenting and analyzing alternative solutions to the conflict between
the CDA and the FHA proposed by various scholars).
149
Supra Part II.C (discussing the enactment of the CDA).
150
Supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress did not foresee the
conflict between the CDA and the FHA when it enacted the CDA).
151
Supra text accompanying note 138 (containing the Author’s proposed revisions to the
CDA).
152
Supra text accompanying note 138 (containing this author’s proposed revisions to the
CDA).
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screen sexually explicit or offensive materials, has effectively eviscerated
the advertising provision of the FHA and left victims of housing
discrimination without a form of recovery for online FHA violations.
The Good Samaritan provision has several textual flaws, allowing
for immunity broader than that envisioned by Congress and creating
confusion as to how its two subparts should interact. These flaws could
be cured by revisions that clarify how and when the CDA should apply.
Furthermore, the addition of a clause limiting the application of the
Good Samaritan provision only to those instances listed in the statute
closes the door on the use of the CDA to protect interactive computer
services from third-party FHA violations, as well as protects against
future misuses of the CDA.
The judiciary cannot avoid affording immunity to interactive
computer services for third-party FHA violations because the current
text of the CDA demands such immunity. Rather than encourage the
judiciary to engage in extreme activism in the name of public policy, the
Author argues that the resolution to the conflict between the CDA and
FHA is a textual revision by Congress and encourages legislators to draft
statutes that clarify the intent behind their enactment. While a policy
section provides some insight to future interpreters, legislators should
strive to ensure that the substantive text of the law also embodies the
specific intent of the statute.
Although those who wish to engage in housing discrimination have
taken advantage of the Internet as their new frontier, Congress has the
power to force interactive computer services to take responsibility for the
content on their websites and forums and to prevent the Internet from
serving as a catalyst of reversion to the same deplorable attitudes and
housing prejudices that plagued America more than half a century ago.
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